LOREA-cyber-coder-30B-A3B-v5.1
A cybersecurity / reverse-engineering / agentic-pentest specialization of Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct
(4-bit, MLX). Mixture-of-experts (~30B total, ~3B active per token), runs locally on Apple Silicon via mlx-lm.
This is the model that drives LOREA-cyber in the OCLI terminal assistant.
v5.1 is the first model in the series to beat the base model on both MMLU security subjects while adding
genuine multi-step chain-of-thought and keeping strong agentic tool-use.
What it is tuned for
- Ethical, authorized red-team / pentest assistance grounded in real tool output (it does not fabricate
success).
- Agentic tool use — emits tool calls and avoids the empty-result / narrate-don't-act loops small local
models fall into.
- Real chain-of-thought — genuine step-by-step reasoning (restate the concept, evaluate each option,
conclude), answer-verified, not a one-line rationale.
- Reverse engineering (disasm to C) and vulnerability analysis (SQLi, IDOR, command injection, path
traversal, etc.) with detection + remediation.
It confirms authorization first and refuses + redirects for unauthorized attacks, malware, or harm.
Benchmarks (honest)
| Benchmark | base Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-4bit | v4.2 | v5.1 |
|---|
| MMLU security_studies | 71.4 | 69.0 | 77.1 (permutation-confirmed, +2 SE) |
| MMLU computer_security | 80.0 | 79.0 | 82.0 (at/just above parity; n=100 noise floor) |
| CyberMetric held-out | — | 88.7 | 85.2 |
| Agentic behavior scorecard | — | 100% | 93.3% |
Honest read. v5.1 robustly beats base on security_studies (an international-relations subject — confirmed
across answer-option permutations) and sits at/just above base on computer_security (the frozen 4-bit base is
already strong here; at n=100 a 0.82 is within ~0.5 SE of base, so treat it as parity, not a decisive beat). The
trade vs v4.2: v5.1 gains the MMLU subjects + real CoT but gives back ~3.5 pts of CyberMetric, because v4.2's depth
came from cumulative continue-training while v5.1 is a single fresh-from-base run (required to realize its larger
LoRA capacity). Pick v5.1 for an all-round reasoner that beats base on the MMLU security subjects; pick v4.2 if you
want maximum CyberMetric MCQ accuracy.
How it was trained (brief)
LoRA fresh-from-base at a genuinely larger rank than the prior series (which had been silently capped), on a
real-knowledge majority: full real CyberMetric MCQs + real WMDP-cyber + real IR/poli-sci + CS-adjacent MMLU
(in the exact raw-completion format MMLU is scored in, decontaminated 7-gram vs the test splits), plus 766
answer-verified multi-step chain-of-thought traces and an anti-forgetting breadth slice. Agentic tool-use traces
target the common small-model failure modes.
Usage (mlx-lm)
1from mlx_lm import load, generate
2model, tok = load("Soaperloafidksum/LOREA-cyber-coder-30B-A3B-v5.1")
3messages = [
4 {"role": "system", "content": "You are LOREA-cyber, an ethical red-team assistant. Confirm authorization, "
5 "ground every claim in tool output, and refuse unauthorized harm."},
6 {"role": "user", "content": "Explain how a chained IDOR-to-admin-API-key privilege escalation works, and how to fix it."},
7]
8prompt = tok.apply_chat_template(messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=False)
9print(generate(model, tok, prompt=prompt, max_tokens=500, verbose=True))
Serve it: python3 -m mlx_lm.server --model Soaperloafidksum/LOREA-cyber-coder-30B-A3B-v5.1.
Recommended sampling: temperature=0.5, top_p=0.95, repetition_penalty=1.1.
Intended use and limitations
For authorized, lawful security testing, CTF/RE practice, and security education only. It is a 4-bit quantized
30B model: it can still hallucinate, its multi-turn autonomous planning is limited (it executes well when handed a
clear next action but can stall on open-ended recovery), and it is far weaker than frontier models. Verify anything
important. Inherits the base model's license.