SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1.5

Model Details

Model Description

• Model Type: Sentence Transformer
• Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1.5
• Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
• Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
• Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

• Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
• Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
• Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 13,500 training samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 410 tokens mean: 2901.01 tokens max: 6550 tokens	min: 18 tokens mean: 209.23 tokens max: 1169 tokens	min: 27 tokens mean: 219.56 tokens max: 1261 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  cluster: ANALYSIS: Jalota v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2013-11-19[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2013 FC 1176[object Object]File numbers[object Object]IMM-3349-13[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20131119[object Object]Docket:[object Object]IMM-3349-13[object Object]Citation: 2013 FC 1176[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, November 19, 2013[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]MANAV JALOTA[object Object]Applicant[object Object]and[object Object]THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]Respondent[object Object]REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT[object Object]I. INTRODUCTION[object Object][1] This is the judicial review of a decision refusing Mr. Jalota’s application to restore his temporary resident status as a student.[object Object]The restoration application was denied because the Officer was not satisfied that (a) the Applicant was a genuine temporary resident and student; (b) the Applicant had sufficient funds; (c) he would leave Canada at the end of the authorized study; and (d) the co-op component of his studies met some specified criteria.[object Object]II. BACKGROUND[object Object][2] The Applicant is from India and obtained a study permit valid until December 31, 2012.[object Object][3] Having arrived in Canada in January 2011, the Applicant started at one college, transferred to another and finally to a third. All of these transfers are permitted under his permit.[object Object][4] In September 2012 the Applicant applied for an extension of his permit which was refused. The reason for refusal was the officer’s belief that he was not a genuine student, which was stated in the following strong terms:[object Object]You have submitted documentation which lacks credibility as part of your application. This has diminished the overall credibility of your submission.[object Object][5] This is a critical aspect of this whole matter because the refusal does not say in what manner the documents lack credibility; however, the credibility finding is part of the overall restoration file (it was contained in the Tribunal Record as part of the material before the Officer on the restoration matter).[object Object][6] In January 2013 the Applicant made an application to restore status. In so doing, the Applicant followed the Document Checklist – Student issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC]. That document is divided into three parts: the first part applies to “All Applicants”, the second applies to a “Study Permit” and the third applies to “Restoration of Temporary Status”.[object Object][7] Under the Restoration part of the Checklist, CIC asks for:[object Object]1. photocopies of passport pages (also requested under Study Permit);[object Object]2. copy of current immigration document; and[object Object]3. documents related to loss of status.[object Object][8] In the covering letter for the application to restore, the Applicant enclosed transcripts and attendance records. He went on to note that he had funds to carry him through the school semester and offered to supply evidence if required.[object Object][9] The application for restoration was denied for the reasons earlier described.[object Object][10] The Global Case Management System [GCMS] identified the Officer’s concerns:[object Object]• failure to submit proof of funds;[object Object]• failure to submit transcripts from previous studies;[object Object]• absence of studies from August 2011 to January 2012; and[object Object]• failure in a college letter of acceptance to give certain details of co-op program’s importance.[object Object]There is nothing in those Notes concerning the failure to leave Canada at the end of the study permit.[object Object][11] The Respondent concedes that there was a breach of procedural fairness when the Officer failed to request prior transcripts but based the decision on the failure to produce those transcripts.[object Object][12] The Respondent contends that despite the breach of procedural fairness, the decision is reasonable based on the absence of financial information. The Respondent seeks to carve out financial information as a discrete ground for the decision which can breathe life into an otherwise infirm decision.[object Object]III. ANALYSIS[object Object][13] It is well accepted that a breach of natural justice in decision making is an error of law and jurisdiction which results in the whole decision being quashed. There are very limited and exceptional circumstances where a breach will not have that result – such as where the breach could not have affected the result (Lahocsinszky v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 275, 129 ACWS (3d) 769).[object Object][14] In the present instance the breach is the grounds for one of the findings against the Applicant. It cannot be said that the breach did not affect the result. This is not a case where it is futile to send the matter back for redetermination because the result is inevitable (Mobil Oil Canada Ltd v Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 SCR 202).[object Object][15] Therefore, on that ground alone, this judicial review will be granted.[object Object][16] However, it is important to address the Respondent’s claim that the absence of financial information was fatal to the restoration application and therefore the decision should be sustained.[object Object][17] The Respondent’s own checklist does not ask for any financial information per se as part of a restoration application, although it is listed as a requirement for study permit applications. For restoration applications, the key requirement is production of the documents related to loss of status. If the Respondent wished to have financial or other documents, it should have asked for them either in the Checklist or by additional request. Any confusion in the Checklist lies at the feet of the Respondent and it is a further breach of procedural fairness to have a misleading document supplied to the public (Lim v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 657, 272 FTR 293).[object Object][18] This breach is particularly so where the Applicant confirmed his financial situation and informed the Respondent that he was prepared to provide evidence if asked. It is no answer to say that section 182 of the Immigration and Refugee Regulations, SOR/2002-227, requires, on a restoration application, that an applicant meet the initial requirements for their stay. The Applicant met the initial requirements at the time of his first application, the evidence was in the file and there was nothing to suggest that anything had changed.[object Object][19] The core problem with this matter is the requirement to produce documents related to the loss of status – as specified in the Checklist. It requires one to determine the cause of the loss of status.[object Object][20] It is not clear from the decision denying the extension of the permit – the cause of the loss of status – what the real problem was with the Applicant’s documents. It is unfair to leave a party with questions as to what was incredulous about his documents. Unfortunately, in this case, the Applicant never asked.[object Object][21] However, since the stated reason for refusal was concern about the Applicant being a genuine student, not that he lacked sufficient funds, it is reasonable to conclude that the loss of status related to academic matters not financial. It was therefore reasonable for the Applicant to address those issues in his restoration application – which he did.[object Object][22] It is incumbent on the Respondent to state the reasons for loss of status in sufficient terms that an applicant can address those reasons in any further relief he may claim.[object Object][23] The Respondent acknowledges that on this issue, it breached procedural fairness in respect to not requesting earlier transcripts. The problem is deeper than that. The core unfairness lay in the reasons for denying the extension which then led to the problems in addressing the restoration application.[object Object][24] The Respondent’s reliance on financial issues is a new-found basis; not the basis for the original loss of status.[object Object][25] It is a breach of procedural fairness to rely on a grounds not cited in the original decision without giving the Applicant notice that this ground of financial sustainability is now at issue – just as it was a breach of procedural fairness to not give notice that earlier transcripts were required (a point the Respondent properly concedes).[object Object][26] These breaches of procedural fairness are further grounds for quashing the decision denying restoration.[object Object][27] Lastly, the Respondent has put forward no basis for concluding that the Applicant would not leave Canada. It is not sufficient to just run through the various grounds for denial of the application, as if checking off a list, without giving reasons for the conclusion.[object Object][28] As an overall conclusion, the allegation of lack of credibility of the Applicant because of problems with his documents seems to have permeated this file. If the Respondent had problems with the documents, it was obliged to state what those problems were. Conclusionary statements are not “reasons”.[object Object]IV. CONCLUSION[object Object][29] This judicial review will be granted, the decision will be quashed, and the matter referred back to a different officer for a fresh determination.[object Object][30] There are no questions for certification.[object Object]JUDGMENT[object Object]THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is granted, the decision is quashed and the matter is to be referred back to a different officer for a fresh determination.[object Object]"Michael L. Phelan"[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]IMM-3349-13[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]MANAV JALOTA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]Vancouver, British Columbia[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]November 14, 2013[object Object]REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT:[object Object]PHELAN J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]november 19, 2013[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]Laura Best[object Object]For The Applicant[object Object]Adam Taylor[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]Embarkation Law Group[object Object]Barristers and Solicitors[object Object]Vancouver, British Columbia[object Object]For The Applicant[object Object]William F. Pentney[object Object]Deputy Attorney General of Canada[object Object]Vancouver, British Columbia[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]	cluster: ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the case by considering the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The court held that a breach of natural justice in decision-making is an error of law and jurisdiction that results in the whole decision being quashed, unless there are exceptional circumstances where the breach could not have affected the result. In this case, the breach of procedural fairness was not limited to the failure to request prior transcripts but was also evident in the unclear decision-making process and the officer's reliance on new-found grounds.The court also examined the Document Checklist – Student issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and found that it did not ask for financial information per se as part of a restoration application. The key requirement for restoration applications was the production of documents related to the loss of status. The court concluded that the officer's failure to request financial information was a breach of procedural fairness, particularly since the person concerned had confirmed his financial situation and offered to provide evidence if required.	cluster: SUMMARY: [object Object][object Object][object Object]The person concerned, a student from India, initially obtained a study permit valid until December 31, 2012. He started his studies at one college, transferred to another, and then to a third, all of which were permitted under his study permit. In September 2012, the person concerned applied for an extension of his permit, but it was refused because the officer believed he was not a genuine student. This decision was based on the officer's finding that the documentation submitted lacked credibility. However, the officer did not specify what was lacking in credibility.[object Object][object Object]The person concerned then made an application to restore his temporary resident status as a student in January 2013. He followed the Document Checklist – Student issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, which included providing photocopies of passport pages, a copy of his current immigration document, and documents related to the loss of status. The application was denied for reasons similar to the initial extension refusal, including the lack of proof of funds, failure to submit transcripts from previous studies, absence of studies from August 2011 to January 2012, and failure in a college letter of acceptance to give certain details of the co-op program's importance.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The issue before the court was whether the decision to deny the person concerned's application to restore his temporary resident status as a student was reasonable and whether the officer's failure to request prior transcripts and the lack of clarity in the decision-making process breached procedural fairness.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court ruled that the decision to deny the person concerned's application to restore his temporary resident status as a student was unreasonable due to the breach of procedural fairness. The officer failed to request prior transcripts, which was a critical piece of information, and the decision-making process was unclear. The court also found that the officer's reliance on financial issues as a basis for denying the restoration application was a new-found ground that was not cited in the original decision, which was a further breach of procedural fairness.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court analyzed the case by considering the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The court held that a breach of natural justice in decision-making is an error of law and jurisdiction that results in the whole decision being quashed, unless there are exceptional circumstances where the breach could not have affected the result. In this case, the breach of procedural fairness was not limited to the failure to request prior transcripts but was also evident in the unclear decision-making process and the officer's reliance on new-found grounds.[object Object][object Object]The court also examined the Document Checklist – Student issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and found that it did not ask for financial information per se as part of a restoration application. The key requirement for restoration applications was the production of documents related to the loss of status. The court concluded that the officer's failure to request financial information was a breach of procedural fairness, particularly since the person concerned had confirmed his financial situation and offered to provide evidence if required.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court concluded that the decision to deny the person concerned's application to restore his temporary resident status as a student was unreasonable due to the breach of procedural fairness. The court granted the judicial review, quashed the decision, and referred the matter back to a different officer for a fresh determination.
  cluster: ISSUES: Melo Castrillon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2018-05-01[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2018 FC 470[object Object]File numbers[object Object]IMM-1617-17[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20180501[object Object]Docket: IMM-1617-17[object Object]Citation: 2018 FC 470[object Object][ENGLISH TRANSLATION][object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, May 1, 2018[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]RUBY AMPARO MELO CASTRILLON[object Object]Applicant[object Object]and[object Object]THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]Respondent[object Object]JUDGMENT AND REASONS[object Object][1] Ruby Amparo Melo Castrillon seeks judicial review (under section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27) [IRPA]) of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) finding that Ms. Melo Castrillon is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.[object Object]I. Preliminary Issue[object Object][2] The RPD’s decision was made under more nuanced circumstances. Its decision on March 13, 2017, related to Ms. Melo Castrillon and four members of her immediate family. Ms. Melo Castrillon is excluded under section 98 of the IRPA. With regard to the other four claimants, the RPD found that there was no serious possibility of them being considered Convention refugees or persons in need of protection given the lack of credibility of their claim. The RPD also seems to have found that this is the case for Ms. Melo Castrillon. Ms. Melo Castrillon is the sole applicant in this judicial review. She seeks judicial review of only the aspect of the decision regarding her exclusion under section 98.[object Object][3] It is paradoxical for the applicant to seek judicial review of only one part of the RPD’s decision. As counsel for the respondent observed, it seems that the RPD not only declared Ms. Melo Castrillon to be excluded, but also found that she was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The applicant is contesting the first finding that she is excluded, but not the finding that none of the claimants could qualify under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. If that is true, even if the applicant were successful in her case before the Court, that would not set aside the finding that she is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection because she is not contesting that aspect of the decision. This makes the application for judicial review moot since, either way, the applicant cannot succeed in her effort to benefit from sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA (Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342 [Borowski] at page 353).[object Object][4] Nevertheless, the Court heard the parties because leave was given by this Court, and it decided to review the application for judicial review on merit even though it is moot (Borowski, at pages 358-363). The Court is convinced that the applicant could reasonably be excluded pursuant to section 98 of the IRPA.[object Object]II. Issue[object Object][5] Ms. Melo Castrillon, who is the mother of the principal claimant before the RPD, is subject to a particular refusal because, according to the RPD, she is excluded under Article 1E of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1E reads as follows:[object Object]1E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.[object Object]1E. Cette Convention ne sera pas applicable à une personne considérée par les autorités compétentes du pays dans lequel cette personne a établi sa résidence comme ayant les droits et les obligations attachés à la possession de la nationalité de ce pays.[object Object]Section 98 of the IRPA incorporates the consequences of being subject to Article 1E into Canadian law. Section 98 reads as follows:[object Object]Exclusion — Refugee Convention[object Object]Exclusion par application de la Convention sur les réfugiés[object Object]98 A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.[object Object]98 La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.[object Object][6] The only decision the RPD made on the basis of section 98 was the one regarding Ms. Melo Castrillon’s exclusion.[object Object]III. Facts[object Object][7] The applicant obtained permanent resident status in Italy on March 12, 2013. She had been living in Italy since August 2007. She decided to leave Italy on May 29, 2015, and return to her home country of Colombia, where her family was living. However, she did not remain there for long. After travelling to the United States in January 2016, she and her immediate family arrived at the Canadian border on January 22, 2016. They then filed a refugee claim. They were arriving from Colombia.[object Object][8] Ms. Melo Castrillon reported that she had left Italy on May 29, 2015, to return to Colombia. There were two hearings before the RPD, on May 4, 2016, and on June 23, 2016. This is of some importance, since a claim was made that permanent resident status may be lost in Italy if a person does not reside there for a period of 12 consecutive months. Indeed, the applicant claims that her absence from Italy resulted in her losing her permanent resident status and, therefore, that section 98 of the IRPA did not apply after May 29, 2016. Since the RPD hearing did not end until June 23, 2016, this would indicate that the RPD erred in excluding the applicant under section 98 because she had been absent for more than 12 consecutive months.[object Object][9] Therefore, the question is as to whether Ms. Melo Castrillon had lost her permanent resident status in Italy, meaning that Article 1E of the Convention could no longer be validly applied to her and that she could therefore claim refugee or person in need of protection status in Canada.[object Object]IV. The RPD’s decision[object Object][10] The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness intervened before the RPD under subsection 170(e) of the IRPA. It has been established that the applicant was a resident of Italy between August 2007 and May 29, 2015. The Minister made allegations about Ms. Melo Castrillon’s legal situation. The Minister alleges that she claimed to have permanent resident status in Italy during her point-of-entry interview on January 23, 2016. In addition, the Minister said that he had received confirmation from the Italian authorities that Ms. Melo Castrillon holds a permanent residence permit issued on March 12, 2013. The Minister stated that there are conditions that could result in the loss of permanent resident status in Italy. However, the applicant did not file any such evidence. That is why the Minister is arguing that there is a prima facie case that the applicant was still a permanent resident in Italy on the day of the RPD hearing. According to the Minister, this would mean that section 98 of the IRPA provides that Ms. Melo Castrillon is simply excluded by the application of Article 1E of the Convention and cannot be considered a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection in Canada.[object Object][11] The RPD placed little importance on the fact that the applicant apparently claimed on two different forms that she had begun living in Italy in November 2004 and had resided in Italy since August 2007. Furthermore, it is established that she stated during her interview on January 23, 2016, that she had permanent resident status in Italy.[object Object][12] Therefore, the following issues were before the RPD:[object Object]a) Ms. Melo Castrillon was a permanent resident of Italy until her departure on May 29, 2015;[object Object]b) The period of 12 consecutive months is being considered for the purposes of Canadian law from the date of departure until the hearing before the RPD;[object Object]c) Therefore, the one-year period had not elapsed on the day the applicant made a refugee claim in Canada or on May 4, 2016, the day the hearing began, but it had elapsed on June 23, 2016, the day of the second hearing;[object Object]d) A person may lose permanent resident status in Italy if they are outside the European Union for a period of 12 consecutive months;[object Object]e) The RPD was satisfied that permanent resident status in Italy entitles the holder to return there. Furthermore, the RPD found that a permanent resident in Italy has the same rights and obligations as Italian citizens within the meaning of section 98. The RPD based this finding in particular on the index of the National Documentation Package on Italy (May 31, 2016), a national package made available to the public by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. In particular, the RPD seems to have based its conclusion on the following paragraph:[object Object]7. Rights of Individuals Holding an EC Long-Term Residence Permit The State Police website indicates that individuals holding an EC Long-Term Residence Permit are entitled to enter Italy without a visa, to work, to have access to social benefits and services provided by the Italian government, and to “participate in local public life” (Italy 29 Mar. 2010). The Ministry of Interior’s Staying in Italy Legally indicates that foreign nationals with a valid residence permit are granted the same education rights as Italian citizens (ibid. n.d., 21). The same source indicates that foreign nationals with a “regular residence permit” are required to register with the National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN), and are entitled by law to receive health care and have “equal treatment as Italian citizens regarding compulsory contributions, health care given in Italy by the SSN and its time limit” (ibid., 23).[object Object]f) The burden was on the applicant to demonstrate to the RPD’s satisfaction that she had lost permanent resident status. The RPD stated the following in this regard:[object Object][47] [translation] That being said, according to recent evidence from Italian authorities regarding the claimant, there is simply the possibility of losing status; they did not indicate that she was going to lose her status in Italy, nor that she had lost her status at the time of the hearing. Moreover, in the documents the applicant submitted regarding her communications with Italian authorities, there is no confirmation that she had lost her permanent resident status.[object Object]V. Standard of review and analysis[object Object][13] It has been well established that the role of a reviewing judge is solely to ensure that the decision made is legal. Therefore, for certain issues, the reviewing judge must decide whether a given issue is reviewable on the standard of correctness. As the law stands, these issues are rare. In the vast majority of cases, the applicable standard of review is reasonableness (see the recent Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4, at para. 26 et seq., for an illustration of the changes in the law on the appropriate standard). That is the case here, where Article 1E of the Convention must be interpreted. In Majebi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 274 [Majebi], the Federal Court of Appeal stated the following:[object Object][5] First, we disagree that the Federal Court incorrectly reviewed the decision of the Appeal Division on the reasonableness standard of review. As the Federal Court correctly noted, this Court has expressed different opinions on the standard of review that applies to decisions interpreting international instruments. However, authorities that pre-date the articulation of the presumption of reasonableness review set out in cases such as Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 (CanLII), [2011] 3 S.C.R 654 must be approached with caution. In the present case we agree with the Federal Court that nothing in the legislative context reveals Parliament’s intent “not to protect the tribunal’s jurisdiction” (Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 (CanLII), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 46). Nor does the interpretation of the Convention fall into one of the categories of questions to which the correctness standard continues to apply as explained in Alberta Teachers’ at paragraph 30. This conclusion is consistent with the more recent decision of this Court in B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 87 (CanLII), [2014] 4 F.C.R. 326, at paragraphs 58-72.[object Object][6] It follows that the Appeal Division’s interpretation of the Convention was correctly reviewed on the reasonableness standard of review.[object Object][14] In applying that standard, the Court is seeking what makes a decision reasonable. Does the decision fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law? Was there justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process? (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; 2008 1 SCR 190 at para. 47).[object Object][15] No one disputes that the review of the application of Article 1E must be done at a certain point. The parties and the Court agree that the review of the application of Article 1E of the Convention is performed on the last day of the hearing before the RPD. In Majebi, the Court wrote:[object Object][7] The Appeal Division applied the decision of this Court in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Zeng, 2010 FCA 118 (CanLII), [2011] 4 F.C.R. 3 to conclude that the appellants’ status should be considered as of the last day of the hearing before the Refugee Protection Division. We agree with the Federal Court that this was a reasonable conclusion for the Appeal Division to reach.[object Object][16] As James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster explain in The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2014), Article 1E of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees provides that protection is no longer available to a certain category of persons (the other being in Article 1D). These persons benefit from the protection of another state, meaning that the protection of a substitute state, in this case, Canada, is not required. In short, if Ms. Melo Castrillon was able to benefit from the protection of another state at the time of her refugee claim hearing, the claim had to be made to that state.[object Object][17] Of course, there are conditions that result in the loss of Convention benefits. Essentially, these are cases of “de facto nationals,” those who have the rights and obligations attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.[object Object][18] In this case, the issue is to determine whether the applicant was still a “de facto national” of Italy because of her permanent resident status, which entitled her to enter Italy without a visa, among other things. The applicant limited her dispute to her claim that she had lost her permanent resident status 12 months after she left Italy. She is arguing that the loss of status would be automatic.[object Object]VI. Analysis[object Object][19] The applicant says that she did research to confirm whether or not she had lost her status. Neither on the day of the hearing before the RPD, nor since, including on the day of the Court hearing, was she able to determine whether she is a permanent resident of Italy. This, in itself, indicates that the status is not automatically lost. At most, the status can be revoked from those who are absent from the country for 12 months.[object Object][20] Therefore, the sole issue before the Court is to determine whether the RPD’s decision that the applicant had permanent resident status on June 23, 2016, is reasonable. It is not disputed that a person who has been absent from Italy for more than 12 consecutive months could lose their permanent resident status. The question is to determine whether the loss of status is automatic.[object Object][21] To succeed in her claim, the applicant was required to convince the RPD that as of May 30, 2016, she had lost her permanent resident status in Italy. That loss would have to be automatic, or practically so.[object Object][22] As previously noted, the applicant attempted to determine her status in Italy. What is relevant for our purposes is her status on the day of the hearing, June 23, 2016. Despite her attempts, she was unable to confirm her status. If the status was automatically lost on May 30, 2016, i.e. 12 months after she left Italy, it would have been simple for the Italian authorities to confirm the loss of status. That was not the case. This seems to confirm the documentary evidence indicating that refugee status may be revoked if the permanent resident is not on European Community (EC) territory for 12 consecutive months.[object Object][23] The reality is that the applicant has not even established that she was absent from Italy and the EC for 12 consecutive months. All we know is that she apparently left Italy on May 29, 2015. Regardless, what is relevant in this case is that the RPD concluded on the documentary evidence only that the possibility of status revocation exists; it is not lost automatically. It appears that there needs to be an act of revocation. As the RPD observed, if revocation was automatic, there should have been a simple and direct response from the Italian authorities, which suggests that the interpretation of the documentary evidence is correct. Therefore, it must be reasonable.[object Object][24] I consulted the documentary evidence on file and do not doubt the reasonableness of the RPD finding that revocation of permanent residence is possible, but not automatic.[object Object][25] Referencing Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Zeng, 2010 FCA 118 [Zeng], the RPD concluded that Ms. Melo Castrillon had essentially a similar status to that of Italian citizens. Therefore, she is excluded if she was a permanent resident on the day of the RPD hearing, in other words, if she had not lost her permanent resident status on the day of the hearing. Paragraphs 28 and 29 of Zeng speak for themselves:[object Object][28] Considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, does the claimant have status, substantially similar to that of its nationals, in the third country? If the answer is yes, the claimant is excluded. If the answer is no, the next question is whether the claimant previously had such status and lost it, or had access to such status and failed to acquire it. If the answer is no, the claimant is not excluded under Article 1E. If the answer is yes, the RPD must consider and balance various factors. These include, but are not limited to, the reason for the loss of status (voluntary or involuntary), whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in the home country, Canada’s international obligations, and any other relevant facts.[object Object][29] It will be for the RPD to weigh the factors and arrive at a determination as to whether the exclusion will apply in the particular circumstances.[object Object][26] The RPD found that the applicant had permanent resident status on the day of the hearing and that this status is essentially similar to that of Italian citizens. Therefore, it was unnecessary to proceed with an analysis based on the decision tree proposed by the Federal Court of Appeal.[object Object][27] If the applicant cannot establish whether she was automatically excluded from permanent resident status, it was perfectly reasonable for the RPD to conclude that she had that status on the day of the hearing.[object Object]VII. Conclusion[object Object][28] Two questions arise upon review of Article 1E of the Convention. Firstly, does a person’s status in the country where they resided entitle them to the same benefits that the country’s citizens receive? Secondly, does this person still have this status if that is the country where they are a “de facto national”? If so, that is the country where the person must seek refuge.[object Object][29] The RPD hearing took place more than 12 months after the applicant left Italy. I cannot find anything unreasonable in considering that the permanent resident status may be revoked after 12 months, but is not automatically revoked. It being established that the applicant had that status when she left Italy, which is not disputed, the burden was on the applicant to establish to the RPD’s satisfaction that the status was automatically or otherwise revoked. This was not done. Consequently, the RPD’s decision was reasonable on its face as to the maintenance of the status on the hearing date. The rights conferred by this status in Italy are similar to the rights and obligations attached to the possession of the nationality of that country, as required by Article 1E. As a result, the application for judicial review must be dismissed, because the RPD’s decision is reasonable.[object Object][30] The parties did not indicate that there is a question within the meaning of subsection 74(d) of the IRPA. There is no serious question of general importance to certify.[object Object]JUDGMENT in file IMM-1617-17[object Object]THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:[object Object]The application for judicial review is dismissed;[object Object]No questions of general importance are proposed or certified.[object Object]“Yvan Roy”[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]IMM-1617-17[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]RUBY AMPARO MELO CASTRILLON v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]April 16, 2018[object Object]JUDGMENT AND REASONS:[object Object]ROY J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]May 1, 2018[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]Nancy Munoz Ramirez[object Object]For the applicant[object Object]Thi My Dung Tran[object Object]For the respondent[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]Nancy Cristina Munoz Ramirez[object Object]ROA Services Juridiques[object Object]Montréal, Quebec[object Object]For the applicant[object Object]Attorney General of Canada[object Object]Montréal, Quebec[object Object]For the respondent[object Object]	cluster: ISSUES: The person concerned sought judicial review of the RPD's decision, arguing that she had lost her permanent resident status in Italy after being absent for 12 consecutive months. The issue before the court was whether the RPD's decision that the person concerned had permanent resident status on June 23, 2016, was reasonable.	cluster: SUMMARY: [object Object][object Object][object Object]The person concerned, Ruby Amparo Melo Castrillon, is a Colombian national who obtained permanent resident status in Italy on March 12, 2013. She had been living in Italy since August 2007. However, she left Italy on May 29, 2015, and returned to Colombia. She then traveled to the United States and eventually arrived at the Canadian border on January 22, 2016, with her immediate family. They filed a refugee claim, and the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) conducted two hearings, on May 4, 2016, and June 23, 2016. The RPD found that the person concerned was excluded under section 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) because she was a permanent resident of Italy until her departure on May 29, 2015, and had not lost her permanent resident status.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The person concerned sought judicial review of the RPD's decision, arguing that she had lost her permanent resident status in Italy after being absent for 12 consecutive months. The issue before the court was whether the RPD's decision that the person concerned had permanent resident status on June 23, 2016, was reasonable.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court applied the reasonableness standard of review, as established in the case of Majebi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). The court considered the documentary evidence and the RPD's findings, which indicated that the possibility of status revocation exists, but it is not automatic. The court also considered the case of Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Zeng, which established that a person's status in the country where they resided entitles them to the same benefits that the country's citizens receive.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court analyzed the RPD's decision and found that it was reasonable. The court noted that the person concerned had not established that she was automatically excluded from permanent resident status and that the RPD's conclusion that she had that status on the day of the hearing was reasonable. The court also considered the documentary evidence, which indicated that refugee status may be revoked if the permanent resident is not on European Community (EC) territory for 12 consecutive months. However, the court found that the RPD's interpretation of the documentary evidence was correct, and that revocation of permanent residence is possible, but not automatic.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court concluded that the RPD's decision was reasonable and dismissed the person concerned's application for judicial review. The court found that the person concerned had not established that she had lost her permanent resident status in Italy and that the RPD's decision was consistent with the requirements of Article 1E of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The court also noted that the person concerned had not established that there was a serious question of general importance to certify.
  cluster: FACTS: Bell Canada v. Lackman[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2017-06-30[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2017 FC 634[object Object]File numbers[object Object]T-800-17[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20170629[object Object]Docket: T-800-17[object Object]Citation: 2017 FC 634[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 2017[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bell[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]BELL CANADA[object Object]BELL EXPRESSVU LIMITED PARTNERSHIP BELL MEDIA INC.[object Object]VIDEOTRON S.E.N.C.[object Object]GROUPE TVA INC.[object Object]ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC.[object Object]ROGERS MEDIA INC.[object Object]Plaintiffs[object Object]and[object Object]ADAM LACKMAN dba TVADDONS.AG[object Object]Defendant[object Object]ORDER WITH REASONS[object Object]I. Introduction[object Object][1] On June 9, 2017, a Justice of this Court issued an Anton Piller Order and an Interim Injunction following motions made ex parte and in camera by the Plaintiffs.[object Object][2] Without a doubt, the consideration of ex parte orders – orders that are made without notice to or appearance by the defending party – constitute one of the most challenging issues facing judges in our adversarial system. When the ‘adversary’ is not present, the norms and very foundation of our justice system face serious challenges. For this reason, it is trite law that a party seeking an ex parte order must provide full and frank disclosure to the court. This full and frank disclosure extends not only to the factual underpinnings of the motion, but to the relevant jurisprudence and statutory provisions that might impact upon a judge tasked with rendering a decision in such circumstances. The relevant jurisprudence in this matter has been developed over the past 30 years and sets out the circumstances under which an Anton Piller order may be issued, and how such an order should be executed.[object Object][3] Anton Piller orders are essentially civil search warrants that give a plaintiff access to the premises of the defendant, without notice, to search for and to seize property. While the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s representative cannot enter the premises without the permission of the occupant, that permission is normally obtained upon threat of contempt proceedings.[object Object][4] The leading case regarding Anton Piller orders is Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corporation, 2006 SCC 36, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 189 (Celanese). In his opening paragraph in Celanese, Justice Binnie, speaking for the Court stated:[object Object]An Anton Piller order bears an uncomfortable resemblance to a private search warrant. No notice is given to the party against whom it is issued. Indeed, defendants usually first learn of them when they are served and executed, without having had an opportunity to challenge them or the evidence on which they were granted. The defendant may have no idea a claim is even pending. The order is not placed in the hands of a public authority for execution, but authorizes a private party to insist on entrance to the premises of its opponent to conduct a surprise search, the purpose of which is to seize and preserve evidence to further its claim in a private dispute. The only justification for such an extraordinary remedy is that the plaintiff has a strong prima facie case and can demonstrate that on the facts, absent such an order, there is a real possibility relevant evidence will be destroyed or otherwise made to disappear. The protection of the party against whom an Anton Piller order is issued ought to be threefold: a carefully drawn order which identifies the material to be seized and sets out safeguards to deal, amongst other things, with privileged documents; a vigilant court-appointed supervising solicitor who is independent of the parties; and a sense of responsible self-restraint on the part of those executing the order.[object Object][5] Hence, the only justification for what amounts to a party’s right to execute a search warrant in a private dispute (an Anton Piller order) is a demonstrated need to preserve relevant evidence where there is a real possibility of destruction or disappearance of that evidence.[object Object][6] In Celanese at para 35, the Court sets out four essential conditions which must be established by the plaintiff before an Anton Piller order may issue. These conditions are reaffirmed in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Malik, 2011 SCC 18 at para 29, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 657 (Malik), and state:[object Object]There must be a strong prima facie case;[object Object]The damage to the plaintiff of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, potential or actual, must be very serious;[object Object]There must be convincing evidence that the defendant has in its possession incriminating documents or things; and[object Object]There must be a real possibility that the defendant may destroy such material before the discovery process can do its work.[object Object][7] The four conditions were deemed to have been met by the justice at the June 9, 2017 hearing, and an Anton Piller Order was issued. Both the Anton Piller Order and the Interim Injunction were made for a period of 14 days only.[object Object][8] The Anton Piller Order was fully executed within the 14 days set out in the order. On June 21, 2017, the Interim Injunction was extended to June 30, 2017, on consent of the parties, in order to provide the Court the opportunity to more fully consider the Plaintiffs’ review motion, in which they seek:[object Object]A declaration that the Anton Piller Order was lawfully issued and that the Order and accompanying Interim Injunction were lawfully carried out;[object Object]An order authorizing the Plaintiffs to withdraw a deposit of $50,000 deposited on June 9, 2017 as security for damages;[object Object]An order that paragraphs C-17 to C-20 of the Order made on June 9, 2017 remain valid until final determination of this proceeding;[object Object]An interlocutory injunction pursuant to Rule 373 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (the Rules), which would effectively result in the continuation of the interim injunction issued on June 9, 2017 until final determination of this proceeding.[object Object]An order for a mandatory injunction that would require the Defendant to continue to provide login credentials, passwords and other necessary access to material that was targeted by the Anton Piller Order. The effect of this order, if granted, would be to provide a continuous search warrant to the Plaintiffs until this matter is finally determined.[object Object]Costs to be awarded on a solicitor-client basis.[object Object]II. The Parties and the Relevant Facts[object Object][9] The Plaintiffs are corporations, limited partnerships or general partnerships who are either broadcasters who operate television stations, or broadcasting distribution undertakings pursuant to the Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11 who receive broadcasts from several televisions stations. The broadcasters contend that they own the Canadian rights to communicate a variety of programs to the public by telecommunication via television and online broadcast. More precisely, the Plaintiffs Bell Media Inc., Rogers Media Inc. and Groupe TVA Inc. (the “Broadcasters”) contend that, among other things, they hold the Canadian rights to undertake the following actions pursuant to section 3 of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (the Act):[object Object](a) Communicate the Plaintiffs programs to the public by telecommunication via television broadcast, including the right to[object Object](b) make the Plaintiffs programs available to the public by telecommunications via television broadcast in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to them from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public; and[object Object](c) authorize such acts.[object Object][10] The broadcasting undertakings contend that they own the right to transmit television broadcasts to subscribers by various means of telecommunication, such as by satellite signal, co-axial cable, fibre optics, and hybrid fibre optics/co-axial cable.[object Object][11] The Defendant is a software developer who has developed add-ons to an open source media player application known as KODI. Some KODI add-ons permit users to gain access to a vast amount of video content allegedly owned and distributed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant has developed add-ons that permit users to access material which is clearly “non-infringing content”, as well as material which the Plaintiffs claim to be “infringing content”. To the extent that the add-ons developed by the Defendant permit access to allegedly “infringing content”, the Plaintiffs contend that they suffer damages. While the Defendant has not yet filed a Statement of Defence in this matter, he claims there is no violation of the Act flowing from his operations. He contends his activities are protected by subparagraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Act, which provides as follows:[object Object][…] a person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public; […].[object Object][12] The Defendant says the jurisprudence arising from the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (SOCAN), supports his position that he is not “communicating” any content. He is merely making it accessible, much like Google and other search engines. In fact, he candidly refers to his operation as a “mini-Google”.[object Object][13] In addition to claiming that the products developed by him are compliant with the Act, the Defendant contends that the Act provides the Plaintiffs with a potential remedy should they conclude a violation exists. He says that remedy is found in paragraph 41.27(5) of the Act, whereby the Plaintiffs may provide him notice of the alleged infringement and afford him the opportunity to remedy the violation. The Defendant contends that, if there was any violation of the Act, which he denies, the Plaintiffs employed a “bombe atomique” by requesting an Anton Piller order instead of exercising the less draconian methods available under the Act.[object Object]III. The Issues before me[object Object][14] The Court’s role at this early stage of the litigation is clearly not to decide the merits of the case (Celanese, above, para 1). My role is to apply a de novo evaluation of the Anton Piller Order after having heard the opposing point of view (John Stagliano Inc. v. Elmaleh, 2006 FC 585 at para 110, 292 FTR 208; Canadian Private Copying Collective v Amico Imaging Services Inc, 2004 FC 469 at paras 27-28, 249 FTR 312). This requires the Court to reconsider the four requirements necessary for the issuance of an Anton Piller order, namely: (i) that there is a strong prima facie case; (ii) that the damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s alleged misconduct, potential or actual, is very serious; (iii) that there is convincing evidence that the defendant has in its possession incriminating documents or things; and (iv) that there is a real possibility that the defendant may destroy such material before the discovery process can do its work (Celanese, above, at para 35; Malik, above, at para 29).[object Object][15] With respect to the interlocutory injunction, I must determine whether the Plaintiffs have met the tripartite test set out in Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd., [1987] 1 SCR 110, 38 DLR (4th) 321 (Metropolitan Stores), and RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 111 DLR (4th) 385 (RJR MacDonald). That is: (i) is there a serious issue to be tried?; (ii) have the Plaintiffs demonstrated they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted?; and; (iii) does the balance of convenience favour the granting of the injunction? The test is conjunctive. I also note that the “strong prima facie case” requirement for the issuance of an Anton Piller order is a higher standard than the “serious issue to be tried” standard applicable to the first criteria of the test for an interlocutory injunction (Indian Manufacturing Ltd. v. Lo, [1996] 2 FCR 647, 67 CPR (3d) 132; Havana House Cigar & Tobacco Merchants Ltd. v. Doe, [1999] FCJ No. 1225 at para 27, 1 CPR (4th) 521).[object Object]IV. The Evidence[object Object][16] In the affidavit principally relied upon by the Plaintiffs, the affiant deposes, among other things, that the Defendant’s business, known as “TVAddons”, hosts over “1500 Add-ons in total”. He also deposes that, of these 1500 Add-ons, there is a curated list of 22 Add-ons, “almost all of which are infringing Add-ons”. It follows that, from the Plaintiffs’ own evidence, just over 1% of the Add-ons developed by the Defendant are alleged to be “infringing Add-ons”. This is consistent with the Defendant’s affidavit, wherein he deposes that there are 1400 Add-ons available on the TVAddons website, the majority of which are unrelated to alleged “illegitimate Hosting Sites”.[object Object][17] Both the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendant’s principal affiants describe the KODI software application as an “open source”, which means that it is available to the general public for use and/or modification of its original design. The Defendant deposes that the KODI application “without any add-on added to it, is used to search, execute, stream or download any type of digital files such as pictures, music, videogames, videos, interactive files, etc.”, and then goes on to say that, contrary to what is affirmed by the Plaintiffs’ affiant, “KODI is not limited to accessing content that is on the computer of the users. The KODI application includes a list of add-ons that are Web Search add-ons”. The Plaintiff’s affiant spent some time in his affidavit explaining how the Defendant would have accessed the work “Orphan Black” by using his Add-ons. The Defendant, in his affidavit, demonstrated the same search results using Google, hence his assertion that his site is a “mini-Google” and is therefore contemplated by the exceptions set out and discussed above in SOCAN.[object Object][18] On this Review Motion, the complete hearing before the justice who granted the Anton Piller Order is to be considered. Part of that record contains the following exchange:[object Object]Justice: And on the next page, paragraph 5, so the experts would deactivate the TV Add-ons domains and sub-domains, so you really want to neutralize the Defendant’s operations?[object Object]Lawyer for the Plaintiffs: Yeah, completely.[object Object]Justice: Completely…[object Object]Lawyer for the Plaintiffs: Yeah.[object Object]Justice: So it’s more than saying you’re enjoined of not operating or communicating, you really want to neutralize the guy.[object Object]Lawyer for the Plaintiffs: Yeah, completely, that’s for sure. Yeah. We use his passwords, we shut down everything, we change the password and we change everything and it cannot be reactivated by him or by someone else. That’s the goal.[object Object][19] According to the Anton Piller Order, the “search” was to be conducted between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., unless it was reasonably necessary to depart from those hours. I conclude that this search includes any interview considered necessary by the independent solicitor and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel. In his affidavit, the independent solicitor deposed that on June 12, 2017, the questioning of the Defendant commenced at 2:40 p.m. and “lasted until approximately midnight”. The interrogation (my word) of the Defendant therefore lasted more than 9 hours. I acknowledge that the interrogation was interrupted, according to the independent solicitor, by dinner, and an opportunity for the Defendant to speak to his lawyer. However, it is important to note that the Defendant was not permitted to refuse to answer questions under fear of contempt proceedings, and his counsel was not permitted to clarify the answers to questions. I conclude unhesitatingly that the Defendant was subjected to an examination for discovery without any of the protections normally afforded to litigants in such circumstances (discovery). Here, I would add that the ‘questions’ were not really questions at all. They took the form of orders or directions. For example, the Defendant was told to “provide to the bailiff” or “disclose to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors”.[object Object][20] I find the most egregious part of the questioning to be in in the independent solicitor’s affidavit, wherein he deposes that counsel for the Plaintiffs “provided Defendant Lackman with some names” of other people who might be operating similar websites. It appears the Defendant was required to associate that list of 30 names with names, addresses and other data about individuals that might have some knowledge or relationship to those names. The list and the responses of the Defendant are found on three complete pages in the exhibits of the independent solicitor’s affidavit. I conclude that those questions, posed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, were solely made in furtherance of their investigation and constituted a hunt for further evidence, as opposed to the preservation of then existing evidence.[object Object]V. Analysis[object Object]A. Anton Piller Order[object Object][21] The Anton Pillar Order under review was purposely designed by counsel for the Plaintiffs, as admitted by them, to completely shut down the Defendant’s operations. To the Plaintiffs, it mattered not that, by their own estimate, just over 1% of the Add-ons developed by the Defendant were allegedly used to infringe copyright. I therefore conclude that the purpose of the Anton Piller Order under review was only partly designed to preserve evidence that might be destroyed or that could disappear. I am of the view that its true purpose was to destroy the livelihood of the Defendant, deny him the financial resources to finance a defence to the claim made against him, and to provide an opportunity for discovery of the Defendant in circumstances where none of the procedural safeguards of our civil justice system could be engaged.[object Object][22] With respect to the issue of whether there exists a “strong prima facie case”, I am not convinced. While I acknowledge the purpose of this review is not to try the case, I have nevertheless assessed the strength of the case made out by the Plaintiffs. In doing so, I have carefully considered the arguments made by Defendant’s counsel in relation to his interpretation of the Act and the application of SOCAN to the facts. I have also carefully considered the affidavits offered by both the Defendant and the Plaintiffs’ affiants. I am impressed by the forthright manner in which the Defendant describes his knowledge and use of the open source KODI software and the similarities between TVAddons and Google. The actions performed by the Plaintiffs’ expert to access allegedly infringing material at TVAddons were replicated by the Defendant using Google. In my view, the jurisprudence from SOCAN becomes relevant to this issue. While the prima facie case may have appeared strong before the justice who heard the matter ex parte, the presence of the adversary in the courtroom and the arguments advanced have demonstrated there is nothing more than a serious issue to be tried. The higher threshold of a strong prima facie case is not met.[object Object][23] In the absence of a strong prima facie case, and in the presence of an overly broad order designed to do much more than preserve evidence that might be destroyed or that might disappear, there is little purpose in conducting any further analysis on the issuance and execution of the Anton Piller Order. I conclude that it must fall. I now turn to the issue of the Interlocutory Injunction.[object Object]B. Interlocutory Injunction[object Object][24] While I accept that there exists a serious issue to be tried, and acknowledge that the Plaintiffs may well suffer irreparable harm if the interlocutory injunction is not issued, I am not satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction.[object Object][25] The Defendant has demonstrated he has an arguable case that he is not violating the Act. He has also deposed that TVAddons is his only source of income. If an injunction were granted by this Court, it would effectively bring this litigation to a close, as the Plaintiffs’ admittedly seek to neutralize the Defendant in such a way that it would be impossible for his add-ons to be reactivated “by him or someone else”. Furthermore, if the Defendant is “neutralized” in this way, he may lack the financial resources to mount his defence. In considering the balance of convenience, I also repeat that the Plaintiffs admit that the vast majority of add-ons are non-infringing. Whether the remaining approximately 1% are infringing is very much up for debate. For these reasons, I find the balance of convenience favours the Defendant, and no interlocutory injunction will be issued.[object Object]C. Other[object Object][26] The Plaintiffs have requested a return of their $50,000 deposit paid as security for damages. Given that the Anton Piller Order is now declared unlawful, I leave it to the parties to negotiate the amount, if any, of that deposit that is to be forfeited to the Defendant. Failing agreement among the parties on that issue within 90 days from the issuance of this Order, they may return to this Court for argument and resolution of that issue.[object Object][27] Finally, the Plaintiffs have requested costs to be assessed on a solicitor-client basis. The Defendant indicated that whether he should win or lose on this Review Motion, he considers it appropriate that costs be awarded in the cause. As a result, this Court will order that costs be in the cause.[object Object]THIS COURT ORDERS that:[object Object]The Interim Injunction issued by this Court on June 9, 2017 is extended, on consent of the parties until June 30, 2017 or until further order of the Court, whichever occurs first. (see paragraph (e) below);[object Object]The motion request by the Plaintiffs for a declaration that the execution of the Anton Piller Order and Interim Injunction were lawfully conducted is dismissed;[object Object]The motion request by the Plaintiffs to authorize the withdrawal from the Court of $50,000 filed on June 9, 2017 as security for damages is dismissed;[object Object]The motion request for an order that paragraphs C-17 to C-20 of the Anton Piller Order made on June 9, 2017 remain in effect until final determination of this proceeding is dismissed. For greater certainty, the Anton Piller Order is fully vacated and declared null and void;[object Object]The motion for an Interlocutory Injunction is dismissed. Effective immediately, the Interim Injunction issued on June 9, 2017 and extended on June 21, 2017 is vacated;[object Object]All remaining orders sought by the Plaintiffs in their amended Notice of Motion filed on June 16, 2017 and heard on June 21, 2017 are dismissed;[object Object]All articles seized during the execution of the Anton Piller Order, including, but not limited to phones, computers, computer equipment, records, communications or evidence proving that communications were made between the Defendant and third parties, domain names, subdomain names, passwords, login credentials, banking information, corporate registry information, information regarding hosting accounts, server information, codes, programmer information, and all transcripts and recordings of the Defendant in response to any questions put to him by any person in the course of the execution of the Anton Piller Order are to be delivered to the Defendant, and no copies of any such materials are to be maintained by independent counsel, plaintiffs, or any person other than the Defendant;[object Object]All affidavits filed by the Plaintiffs in support of the motion for an Anton Piller order are to be sealed and marked “Subject to an order of confidentiality” and placed in Court file T-800-17, and are to remain confidential and under seal until further order of the Court;[object Object]Costs are in the cause;[object Object]I will remain seized with jurisdiction over any motions or requests for directions with respect to the contents of this order.[object Object]“B. Richard Bell”[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]T-800-17[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]BELL CANADA, BELL EXPRESS VU LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, BELL MEDIA INC., VIDEOTRON S.E.N.C., GROUPE TVA INC., ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC., ROGERS MEDIA INC., v ADAM LACKMAN DBA TV ADDONS.AG[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]Montréal, Quebec[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]June 21, 2017[object Object]REASONS FOR ORDER:[object Object]BELL J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]June 30, 2017[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]Me François Guay[object Object]Me Guillaume Lavoie St-Marie[object Object]For The Plaintiff[object Object]Me Éva Richard, Me Karim Renno[object Object]Me Hilal El Ayoubi[object Object]FOR THE DEFENDANT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]Me Karl Delwaide, Me Marie-Gabrielle Bélanger[object Object]Fasken Martineau DuMoulin S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l.[object Object]Tour de la Bourse, bureau 3700[object Object]800, rue Victoria[object Object]Montréal, QC H4Z 1E9[object Object]For The Plaintiff[object Object]Me Bernard Letarte, Me Ludovic Sirois - Attorney General of Canada - Justice Canada[object Object]Bureau SAT-6060[object Object]284 Wellington Street[object Object]Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8[object Object]for the defendant[object Object]	cluster: FACTS: This case involves a dispute between the plaintiffs, a group of Canadian broadcasters and broadcasting undertakings, and the defendant, a software developer, Adam Lackman. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's software, known as TVAddons, allowed users to access copyrighted content without permission. The defendant claimed that his software was compliant with the Copyright Act and that he was not communicating any content, but rather making it accessible like a search engine. The plaintiffs sought an Anton Piller order, which is a civil search warrant that allows a plaintiff to search the defendant's premises without notice, to seize evidence and preserve it. The order was granted by a justice of the Federal Court, but the defendant challenged it on a review motion.	cluster: ANALYSIS: The court's analysis was based on the principles established in the leading case of Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corporation, which sets out the conditions necessary for the issuance of an Anton Piller order. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet these conditions, particularly with respect to the prima facie case and the scope of the order. The court also considered the defendant's argument that his software was compliant with the Copyright Act and that he was not communicating any content, but rather making it accessible like a search engine. The court found that this argument had merit and that the plaintiffs had not met the requirements for an interlocutory injunction.

• Loss: MultipleNegativesRankingLoss with these parameters:
  json

  1{ 2 "scale": 20.0, 3 "similarity_fct": "cos_sim" 4}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 1,500 evaluation samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 370 tokens mean: 2955.16 tokens max: 6550 tokens	min: 32 tokens mean: 213.29 tokens max: 1042 tokens	min: 27 tokens mean: 206.64 tokens max: 973 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  cluster: FACTS: Murphy v. Canada (Attorney General)[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2016-11-02[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2016 FC 1208[object Object]File numbers[object Object]T-192-16[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20161102[object Object]Docket: T-192-16[object Object]Citation: 2016 FC 1208[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, November 2, 2016[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Brown[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]DAPHNE MURPHY[object Object]Applicant[object Object]and[object Object]THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA[object Object]Respondent[object Object]JUDGMENT AND REASONS[object Object]I. Nature of the Matter [1] This is an application for judicial review brought by Daphne Murphy [the Applicant] under s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 of a decision made on October 8, 2015, by a member of the Social Security Tribunal – Appeal Division (SST-AD) [SST-AD Decision] denying the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal. The Applicant sought leave in order to appeal a decision of the Social Security Tribunal – General Division (SST-GD) made on August 28, 2015 [SST-GD Decision], which had dismissed the Applicant’s appeal from a decision denying her application for Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits.[object Object][2] The Applicant is a self-represented litigant. She designated her husband as a representative to assist her after suffering a stroke in November 2011.[object Object][3] Judicial review is granted for the following reasons.[object Object]II. Facts [4] The Applicant is a 58-year-old woman from Gander, Newfoundland. The record shows that she has a significant speech impairment, which was apparent at the hearing. She advises she was unable to speak until she was 7 years old. She obtained a grade 8 education. She married in 1979 and it appears she divorced in 1993. Her husband was in the armed forces. She has two children.[object Object][5] She has a very extensive history of attendances on physicians. A very large number of visits to various doctors and associated reports are documented in the Certified Tribunal Record (CTR) from 2011 going back to the 1990s.[object Object][6] She is able to access the CPP through credits accumulated by way of credit-splitting with her former husband from 1979 to 1993. The record indicates she was not otherwise working; she was raising her two children and advises she was doing some babysitting to make her own money. She also has contributions from her own work in 2007 and 2008, but they were not sufficient to entitle her to disability under the Canada Pension Plan, RSC 1985, c C-8 [CPP Act]. This will be discussed in more detail later.[object Object][7] Her application for a CPP disability pension was made under the ‘late application provisions’, the effect of which is that she may obtain a CPP disability pension if she establishes she was severely disabled (as defined) as of December 31, 1997, and remained severely disabled continuously since then.[object Object][8] The SST-AD conceded the Applicant is currently disabled as a consequence of injuries to her right knee sustained in a fall on September 1, 2009, and damages resulting from a stroke on November 29, 2011. Following the stroke, the Applicant has not been able to work. She has trouble speaking, spelling and walking without a cane or walker. She is only able to walk a little distance before her knee gives out on her and as a result, she is continuously falling. She drags her foot when walking and requires assistance in order to shower, bathe, eat, go for walks and/or do housework. As noted, she has a significant speech impairment – she stutters and therefore has trouble expressing her thoughts.[object Object][9] Therefore, the issue is not whether she is severely disabled now; the issues are whether she was severely disabled as of December 1997, and whether she has remained so continuously.[object Object][10] On April 19, 2011, the Applicant’s claim for disability benefits was denied [Denial Letter]. On January 18, 2012, her claim was again denied after reconsideration by CPP staff [Reconsideration Denial Letter]. The Denial Letter included a list of documents that had been reviewed and considered and specific factors that were considered in coming to a decision. It provided the following as the basis for denial:[object Object]We recognize you have identified limitations resulting from your knee injury and we realize that you may not have been able to do labour intensive work since 2009. However, we concluded that your condition did not start until 2009 and this would not have any effect or [sic] an ability to work in December 1997.[object Object][11] She appealed to the SST-GD.[object Object][12] One relevant factor in the Applicant’s appeal was her work experience. Her contact with the workplace between 1979 and 2011 was minimal. She only made work-related contributions to CPP in 2 of those 32 years, namely 2007 and 2008. She did not work enough in either 2006 or 2010 to warrant CPP premiums, and the small premium she paid in 2006 ($60.53) was refunded. She made no payment in 2010. According to the Respondent’s Record, she worked six months at Tim Hortons’s in Windsor, Nova Scotia, three weeks at Baskin Robbins and two months at Swiss Chalet in Sackville, Nova Scotia. As I mentioned earlier, she also did some babysitting a long time ago.[object Object][13] The Applicant’s appeal to the SST-GD was a paper appeal. In other words, although the Applicant might have had a de novo hearing, the matter proceeded without a hearing on the basis of a file review. The Applicant was given notice that the SST-GD intended to conduct a paper appeal; she was invited to comment and submit additional material, but took no position in that regard. In its decision, the SST-GD explained its reasons for conducting a paper appeal:[object Object][2] The hearing of this appeal was by decision on the record for the following reasons:[object Object]a) The issues under appeal are not complex;[object Object]b) There are no gaps in the information in the file or need for clarification;[object Object]c) Credibility is not a prevailing issue;[object Object]d) The form of hearing respects the requirement under the Social Security Tribunal Regulations to proceed as informally and quickly as circumstances, fairness and natural justice permit.[object Object][14] I pause to note that the paper record before the SST-GD contained a notation by CPP staff, dated September 28, 2011, that the Applicant had a “significant speech impairment.” The same note states that: “[H]er speech impediment prevents her from doing phone work as well as her education.” The decision by the SST-GD to proceed without an oral hearing does not refer to this notation, nor to the Applicant’s speech impairment.[object Object][15] Based on its paper review, the SST-GD denied the Applicant’s appeal. The SST-GD found that the Applicant failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she had a severe and prolonged disability on or before her minimum qualifying period (MQP) of December 31, 1997.[object Object][16] On the issue of the severity of the Applicant’s disability, the SST-GD stated:[object Object][16] There is very little medical evidence prior to the Appellant’s MQP [the date her minimum qualifying period ended, i.e., December 31, 1997]. The evidence on file indicates the Appellant suffered from general medical ailments. The evidence also indicates that the Appellant was able to work for numerous years and attend school after her MQP. Her education and limited work experience may present barriers to employment, but the Tribunal must consider her medical condition as the primary factor.[object Object][emphasis added][object Object][17] Although the SST-GD acknowledged that the Applicant was unable to work at the time of its review, it concluded that there was “no evidence to support that [the Applicant] had a severe disability on or before December 31, 1997 that continues to this day.” Because the test for disability under the CPP Act is conjunctive, the Member did not make a finding on the prolonged criterion.[object Object][18] The Applicant sought leave to appeal to the SST-AD, which denied her application on October 8, 2015.[object Object]III. Decision under Review [19] The SST-AD indicated that, in order to succeed on an application for leave to appeal to the SST-AD under the Department of Employment and Social Development Act, SC 2005, c 34 (DESDA), the Applicant must present some arguable ground upon which the proposed appeal might succeed, citing Kerth v Canada (Minister of Development), [1999] FCJ No 1252 (FC) [Kerth]. The SST-AD also cited case law for the proposition that an arguable case is “akin to whether legally an applicant has a reasonable chance of success”: Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development v Hogervorst, 2007 FCA 41; Fancy v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 63.[object Object][20] The SST-AD noted that, pursuant to s. 58(1) of DESDA, there are only three grounds under which an appeal to the SST-AD can be considered:[object Object]a) the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;[object Object]b) the General Division erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or[object Object]c) the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.[object Object][21] The SST-AD member made the following findings:[object Object][6] The Applicant requested leave to appeal on the basis that she disagreed with the General Division decision. She set out her physical limitations to support this argument. I accept that the Applicant currently has these limitations. The General Division decision correctly stated, however, that in order for the Applicant to receive a Canada Pension Plan disability pension, she had to have been disabled on or before December 31, 1997. It clearly set out the basis for its conclusion that the Applicant was not disabled at that time.[object Object][7] The Applicant’s arguments in support of her request for leave to appeal do not point to any error made by the General Division, or to any breach of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, they are not grounds of appeal under the Act.[object Object][8] The Applicant also argued that she needed money to pay for medication. This argument also does not point to any error or to a breach of natural justice by the General Division. Leave to appeal cannot be granted on this basis.[object Object][22] The SST-AD found that the Applicant had not presented a ground under s. 58 of DESDA upon which she had a reasonable chance of success and consequently denied her application for leave to appeal.[object Object][23] It is from this decision that the Applicant seeks judicial review.[object Object]IV. Issues [24] This matter raises the following issues:[object Object]1. Whether the SST-AD member’s finding that the Applicant did not present a ground of appeal with a reasonable chance of success under s. 58 of DESDA was reasonable?[object Object]2. Whether there is an arguable issue under any of the grounds provided in s. 58(1) of DESDA?[object Object]3. Whether the Member acted unreasonably in finding that there was no reasonable chance for success pursuant to s. 58(2) of DESDA, considering the evidence provided by the Applicant and the law surrounding the definition of “severe”?[object Object]V. Standard of Review [25] In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 57, 62 [Dunsmuir], the Supreme Court of Canada held that a standard of review analysis is unnecessary where “the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question.” The Respondent correctly submits that the decision by the SST-AD granting or refusing leave to appeal should be reviewed in this Court on the reasonableness standard: Tracey v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1300 at para 17; Canada (Attorney General) v Hoffman, 2015 FC 1348 at para 27. In addition, Canada (Attorney General) v O’Keefe, 2016 FC 503 at para 17 indicates that “substantial deference” should be given to the SST-AD.[object Object][26] In Dunsmuir at para 47, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what is required of a court reviewing on the reasonableness standard of review:[object Object]A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.[object Object]VI. Relevant Provisions [27] DESDA governs the operation of the Social Security Tribunal. The grounds for appeal are specifically set out in s. 58(1) of DESDA. The grounds for granting leave to appeal are set out in s. 58(2):[object Object]Grounds of appeal[object Object]Moyens d’appel[object Object]58 (1) The only grounds of appeal are that[object Object]58 (1) Les seuls moyens d’appel sont les suivants :[object Object](a) the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;[object Object]a) la division générale n’a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou a autrement excédé ou refusé d’exercer sa compétence;[object Object](b) the General Division erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or[object Object]b) elle a rendu une décision entachée d’une erreur de droit, que l’erreur ressorte ou non à la lecture du dossier;[object Object](c) the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.[object Object]c) elle a fondé sa décision sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments portés à sa connaissance.[object Object]Criteria[object Object]Critère[object Object](2) Leave to appeal is refused if the Appeal Division is satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success.[object Object](2) La division d’appel rejette la demande de permission d’en appeler si elle est convaincue que l’appel n’a aucune chance raisonnable de succès.[object Object]Decision[object Object]Décision[object Object](3) The Appeal Division must either grant or refuse leave to appeal.[object Object](3) Elle accorde ou refuse cette permission.[object Object][28] The requirements for disability benefits are set out in sections 42 and 44 of the CPP Act. Subsection 44(1)(b)(ii) is referred to as the ‘late applicant provision’ and applies to the Applicant in this case. Under section 44(1)(b)(ii), a disability pension may be paid to a contributor:[object Object]• Who has not reached 65 years of age;[object Object]• To whom no retirement pension is payable;[object Object]• Who is disabled; and,[object Object]• Who is a contributor to whom a disability pension would have been payable at the time the contributor is deemed to have become disabled if an application for a disability pension had been received before the contributor’s application for a disability pension was actually received.[object Object][29] Subsection 42(2) sets out when a person is deemed disabled. A person is considered disabled when they have a “severe and prolonged” mental or physical disability. A disability is considered “severe” when it renders the person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation: CPP Act s. 42(2)(a)(i). A disability is considered “prolonged” where it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death: CPP Act s. 42(2)(a)(ii). This section is conjunctive; a person must satisfy both the “severe” and “prolonged” criteria in order to be found disabled within the meaning of the CPP Act. If they fail to satisfy one of the two criteria, the other need not be assessed. Paragraph 42(2)(b) puts a temporal limit on when a person may be deemed disabled.[object Object]VII. Analysis [30] In my respectful view, judicial review should be granted in this case.[object Object][31] I say this because, on the critical issue of the severity of the Applicant’s disability, the SST-GD misapprehended critical and central evidence concerning the Applicant’s attachment to the workplace, thereby erring in law and basing its decision on an erroneous finding of fact without regard for the material before it, which in my respectful opinion are both bases upon which the SST-AD acting reasonably ought to have granted leave to appeal.[object Object][32] This critical misapprehension occurs in the following passage of the reasons of the SST-GD:[object Object]The evidence also indicates that the Appellant was able to work for numerous years and attend school after her MQP.[object Object][emphasis added][object Object][33] The case turned on the Applicant’s employability, that is, her ability to work. This finding is of central importance because it misstates the nature of the Applicant’s ability to work, and does so in a manner that is not defensible on the record because it is contrary to the record.[object Object][34] There was in fact no evidence that the Applicant was able to work for a single continuous year, let alone the “numerous years” found by the SST-GD. The facts of this case do not support the finding that she “was able to work for numerous years”.[object Object][35] Indeed, the record shows that over the relevant 32 year period (1979 to 2011), the Applicant’s attachment to the workforce was extremely limited: her short term work in 2007 (in Newfoundland) and 2008 (in Nova Scotia) and very little else except babysitting many years ago in Newfoundland. In my respectful view, the SST-GD’s conclusion regarding the Applicant’s workforce attachment was not supported by the evidence before it. The decision is based on a misapprehension of the evidence; in addition, in this central respect, there is no evidence to support it which is an error of law.[object Object][36] In my respectful view, this misapprehension of the evidence, and the absence of evidentiary support, reasonably meets the test set out in paragraph 58(1)(c) of DESDA which provides that a ground of appeal exists where the SST-GD “based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it”. This finding also constituted an error of law per paragraph 58(1)(b) of DESDA. In my view, the Applicant therefore had two arguable grounds upon which her proposed appeal might succeed per Kerth; the Applicant has a reasonable chance of success on these grounds.[object Object][37] In my view, a proper consideration of the evidence may have led to a different outcome, namely the grant of leave to appeal with the possible result that the SST-AD would refer the matter to the General Division for redetermination pursuant to s. 59(1) of DESDA, or grant other relief.[object Object][38] As a consequence, the SST-AD’s decision was not reasonable because it was not justified on the facts and law, as Dunsmuir requires. In my view, this aspect of the decision’s unreasonableness is sufficient basis on which to grant judicial review.[object Object][39] I wish to add that the Applicant, during the hearing before me, said that she was unable to obtain work because of her speech impediment, which, as was noted by CPP staff, is a significant impairment. She advised that employers she contacted declined to hire her because her speech impediment would be disruptive to other staff and upsetting to customers. She stated she was not wanted because of the speech impediment she was born with. She said she could not even get employment in a back room of a chain restaurant because of her speech impediment. She says she was dismissed on account of her speech impairment. She challenges one record suggesting otherwise: an employer said she ceased working because she moved and, although she had moved, it was only from Sackville to Bedford, which she said is a 20 minute drive.[object Object][40] The jurisprudence, as the SST-GD acknowledged, establishes that the ‘severity’ criteria for CPP disability pension purposes must be assessed in a “real world” context: Villani v Canada (A.G.), 2001 FCA 248, which entails keeping in mind factors such as age, level of education, language proficiency and past work, life experience and, importantly, employability.[object Object][41] In my view, in making these verbal submissions to the Court at the hearing, the Applicant raises her “real world” considerations which, if accepted, might entitle her to the disability pension she seeks because these submissions speak directly to the core issue of her employability. Villani requires consideration of the “real world” matters of her significant speech impediment, and employability which may be related, in the assessment of her alleged severe disability.[object Object][42] The Federal Court of Appeal describes the “real world” approach. In the words of Isaac, J.A. (as he then was):[object Object][33] The “real world” approach was first adopted by the Board in Edward Leduc v. Minister of National Health and Welfare, CCH Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Transfer Binder 1986-1992 at ¶ 8546, pp. 6021-6022 (January 29, 1988). In that case, the Board found for the applicant on the following basis:[object Object]The Board is advised by medical authority that despite the handicaps under which the Appellant is suffering, there might exist the possibility that he might be able to pursue some unspecified form of substantially gainful employment. In an abstract and theoretical sense, this might well be true. However, the Appellant does not live in an abstract and theoretical world. He lives in a real world, people [sic] by real employers who are required to face up to the realities of commercial enterprise. The question is whether it is realistic to postulate that, given all of the Appellant’s well documented difficulties, any employer would even remotely consider engaging the Appellant. This Board cannot envision any circumstances in which such might be the case. In the Board’s opinion, the Appellant, Edward Leduc, is for all intents and purposes, unemployable.[object Object][43] The Federal Court of Appeal in Villani requires that the SST-GD and SST-AD interpret and apply the CPP Act in a large and liberal manner: paragraph 27 of Villani states:[object Object]In Canada, courts have been especially careful to apply a liberal construction to so-called ‘social legislation.’ In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para 36, the Supreme Court emphasized that benefits-conferring legislation ought to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner and that any doubt arising form the language of such legislation ought to be resolved in favour of the claimant…. has been adopted in a number of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.[object Object][44] At paragraph 28, Villani also notes that the CPP Act is benefits-conferring legislation, and at para 29 states that any ambiguity flowing from its words must be resolved in favour of a claimant for disability benefits. Also of importance for the case at bar is that Villani requires that the proper application of the severity test involves consideration of the applicant’s employability:[object Object]44 In my respectful view, the Board has invoked the wrong legal test for disability insofar as it relates to the requirement that such disability must be "severe". The proper test for severity is the one that treats each word in the definition as contributing something to the statutory requirement. Those words, read together, suggest that the severity test involves an aspect of employability.[object Object][45] The failure to reasonably determine the Applicant’s workforce attachment means that her Villani real-world ‎assessment was incomplete at best. This is further reason why judicial review must be granted. The Applicant had a statute-established right, supported by the case law, to a more comprehensive disability review that considers her employability in the “real world” in which she lived and lives. In my view, she did not have such a review.[object Object][46] In this connection, I doubt very much that a proper Villani assessment may take place without a de novo hearing before the SST-GD given her limited education and limited ability to make written representations, her speech impediment as documented by CPP staff, coupled with the difficulty she has expressing her thoughts.[object Object][47] While the Applicant did not explicitly raise these real world considerations in her written filings, they certainly were on the record as a result of her discussions with CPP staff. As outlined above, the paper record reviewed by the SST-GD contained a CPP staff member’s note that the Applicant had a “significant speech impairment”. In addition, to reiterate, the same CPP staff stated that: “[H]er speech impediment prevents her from doing phone work as well as her education.”[object Object][48] Importantly, this Applicant is still in the system and in my view should have an opportunity to have these considerations addressed; they are important to her, they were raised on the record, but were not considered either by the SST-GD, or by the SST-AD. In my respectful view, it is not safe to leave them unaddressed.[object Object][49] In my view, the Applicant’s “real world” issues and employability are best assessed in a de novo appeal before the SST-GD.[object Object][50] I am concerned as all parties must be with delay in resolving the Applicant’s rights. Her significant speech impediment and “real world” situation and employability were first documented by CPP staff more than five years ago: the relevant CPP’s Development Contact Record is dated September 28, 2011. Given this and the importance of bringing this matter to a resolution, and in light of the fact that the Applicant is now disabled, and considering subsection 18.3(3) of the Federal Courts Act, I considered but decided against directing that the SST-AD cause the SST-GD to proceed with a fresh appeal de novo so that the Applicant’s real world employability may be assessed as required by Villani, together with other issues the Applicant may raise. I decline to do so because this is a matter for the SST-AD to determine.[object Object]VIII. Conclusion [51] Judicial review is granted.[object Object]IX. Costs [52] The Respondent did not seek costs; in my view this is not a case for costs.[object Object]X. Procedural Note – Style of Cause [53] The Respondent correctly requests that the style of cause in this matter be amended to show the respondent as the Attorney General of Canada. The Applicant consents and therefore it is so ordered, effective immediately.[object Object]JUDGMENT[object Object]THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:[object Object]1. The style of cause is amended to show the Attorney General of Canada as the Respondent, effective immediately.[object Object]2. Judicial review is granted and the Decision of the SST-AD dated October 8, 2015 is set aside.[object Object]3. This matter is remitted to a differently constituted SST-AD for redetermination.[object Object]4. There is no order as to costs.[object Object]"Henry S. Brown"[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]T-192-16[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]DAPHNE MURPHY v THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]Halifax, Nova Scotia[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]SEPTEMBER 13, 2016[object Object]JUDGMENT AND reasons:[object Object]BROWN J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]NOVEMBER 2, 2016[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]Daphne Murphy[object Object]ON HER OWN BEHALF[object Object]Hasan Junaid[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]- NIL -[object Object]self-represented Applicant[object Object]William F. Pentney[object Object]Deputy Attorney General of Canada[object Object]Department of Justice[object Object]ESDC Legal Services[object Object]Gatineau, Quebec[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]	cluster: FACTS: The person concerned, a 58-year-old woman from Gander, Newfoundland, applied for Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits. She had a significant speech impairment and was unable to work due to a stroke she suffered in 2011 and a knee injury she sustained in 2009. She had a limited education and work experience, with only a few short-term jobs between 1979 and 2011. Her application was initially denied in 2011 and again in 2012 after reconsideration. She appealed the decision to the Social Security Tribunal – General Division (SST-GD), which conducted a paper appeal and denied her application in 2015. The SST-GD found that she failed to prove that she had a severe and prolonged disability on or before December 31, 1997, the minimum qualifying period (MQP) for CPP disability benefits. The person concerned then sought leave to appeal to the Social Security Tribunal – Appeal Division (SST-AD), which denied her application in 2015. She subsequently applied for judicial review of the SST-AD's decision.	cluster: CONCLUSION: In conclusion, the court's decision in this case was based on the principle that the SST must interpret and apply the CPP Act in a liberal and generous manner. The court found that the SST-GD and SST-AD had failed to apply this principle in the person concerned's case, and that their decisions were therefore unreasonable. The court's decision was also based on the principle that the person concerned had a right to a more comprehensive disability review that considers her employability in the real world. The court's conclusion was that the SST-AD's decision was not reasonable and that the matter should be remitted to a differently constituted SST-AD for redetermination.
  cluster: CONCLUSION: Altamirano v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2023-07-19[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2023 FC 989[object Object]File numbers[object Object]IMM-4441-22[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20230719[object Object]Docket: IMM-4441-22[object Object]Citation: 2023 FC 989[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, July 19, 2023[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ahmed[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]JOEL MARTINEZ ALTAMIRANO[object Object]EUSEBIA ROSALIA REYES LUNA[object Object]ABAD GILBERTO MORA REYES AZUCENA MORA REYES GAEL MARTINEZ MORA[object Object]Applicants[object Object]and[object Object]THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]Respondent[object Object]JUDGMENT AND REASONS[object Object]I. Overview [1] The Applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”) dated April 26, 2022, confirming the determination of the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”).[object Object][2] The RAD upheld the RPD’s refusal of the refugee claim on the basis that the Applicants have a viable internal flight alternative (“IFA”) in Merida, Mexico.[object Object][3] The Applicants submit that the RAD mischaracterized the Applicants’ nexus to one of the Convention grounds enumerated under section 2(1) of IRPA, and conducted an unreasonable assessment of the IFA in light of the Applicants’ evidence.[object Object][4] For the reasons that follow, I find that the RAD’s decision is reasonable. This application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.[object Object]II. Facts[object Object]A. The Applicants [5] Joel Martinez Altamirano (the “Principal Applicant”), his wife, Azucena Mora Reyes (the “Associate Applicant Azucena”), and their child, Gael Martinez Mora (the “Minor Applicant”), are citizens of Mexico. The Principal Applicant’s mother-in-law, Eusebia Rosalia Reyes Luna (the “Associate Applicant Eusebia”) and brother-in-law, Abad Gilberto Mora Reyes (the “Associate Applicant Abad”), are also citizens of Mexico.[object Object][6] The Associate Applicant Eusebia and her four sons—Jorgé, Ulises, Neftali, and the Associate Applicant Abad—owned a butcher shop in Tehuacán, Puebla, Mexico. The Associate Applicant Azucena assisted at the shop on weekends.[object Object][7] In August 2017, the Applicants claim that Neftali received a phone call from a member of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (“CJNG”), demanding protection money to continue operating the family business. Neftali hung up the call.[object Object][8] In September 2017, the Associate Applicant Abad allegedly received a threatening phone call from a CJNG commander. The Associate Applicant Abad travelled to Canada in November 2017 due to stress associated with this call, but returned to Mexico in December 2018.[object Object][9] In June 2018, Jorgé allegedly received a phone call from a CJNG member demanding money. The Applicants claim that this phone call prompted Jorgé to travel to Canada in June 2018. He made a claim for refugee protection in March 2019, but later withdrew his claim.[object Object][10] On January 28, 2019, the Associate Applicant Eusebia allegedly received a phone call from the CJNG, informing her that they had kidnapped her son, Ulises, and demanding a ransom of 1 million pesos. The Applicants claim that they paid the CJNG a ransom of 200,000 pesos. When the money was paid, CJMG released Ulises on January 31, 2019, after which he relocated to San Quintin, Baja California, Mexico, where he currently resides.[object Object][11] In February 2019, the Associate Applicant Azucena allegedly began receiving phone calls from unknown numbers. On March 22, 2019, the Associate Applicant Azucena, the Principal Applicant, and the Minor Applicant arrived in Canada and made claims for refugee protection on arrival. Fearing that he would also be kidnapped, the Associate Applicant Abad returned to Canada in March 2019 and made a claim for refugee protection. In August 2019, the Associate Applicant Eusebia travelled to Canada and made a claim for refugee protection.[object Object][12] In October 2019, Jorgé returned to Mexico. Upon his return, he relocated to San Quintin, Baja California, Mexico to reside with his brother, Ulises. Neftali relocated to Laredo, Nuevo Leon. Neftali manages the family business in Puebla from his residence in Baja California.[object Object][13] The Applicants testified that Neftali received phone calls from unknown numbers, that there was a suspicious van parked outside the family residence approximately a year after Ulises’ kidnapping, and that their neighbours received phone calls asking for the Associate Applicant Eusebia’s whereabouts.[object Object][14] The Applicants’ refugee claims are based on the fear of persecution or harm in Mexico at the hands of the CJNG cartel for failing to pay the total amount demanded as ransom for the kidnapping of Ulises.[object Object]B. RPD Decision [15] In a decision dated December 30, 2021, the RPD found that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of IRPA, on the basis that they have a viable IFA in Merida.[object Object][16] The RPD found that while the Applicants’ allege that they are victims of criminality by the CJNG; there is insufficient evidence to establish a nexus between these acts and any of the enumerated Convention grounds. The RPD therefore concluded that the Applicants’ claims must be assessed under section 97(1) of IRPA.[object Object][17] The RPD found that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Merida. The test to determine a viable IFA requires that: (1) there is no serious possibility of persecution or risk of harm in the IFA, and (2) it is reasonable in the Applicant’s circumstances to relocate to the IFA (Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706). The second prong of the test places a high evidentiary burden on the Applicant to demonstrate that relocation to the IFA would be unreasonable (Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1367) (“Ranganathan”).[object Object][18] On the first prong of the test, the RPD first noted that Mexico is a large country that allows for freedom of movement and a right to travel within the country. The RPD found that the National Documentation Package (“NDP”) for Mexico provided mixed information about whether the CJNG has a presence or influence in Yucatan. According to the NDP, the CJNG is a “national cartel” and the “most dangerous and largest” cartel in Mexico. Although the NDP states that the CJNG has presence throughout Mexico, it also states that the CJNG is not present in Merida or anywhere in Yucatan.[object Object][19] However, the RPD found no reliable evidence that the CJNG has attempted to locate the Applicants since they left Mexico, Ulises or Jorgé in San Quintin, or Neftali in Laredo. The RPD also found that the Applicants’ testimony regarding suspicious phone calls from unknown numbers, their neighbours receiving phone calls asking for the Associate Applicant Eusebia’s whereabouts, or a suspicious truck parked outside their family is speculative and does not substantiate their claims that they are being pursued by CJNG. The RPD found no evidence to explain why the cartel would rekindle their interest in the Applicants since they left Mexico.[object Object][20] The RPD found that while the NDP evidence confirms that criminal organizations in Mexico extort profitable business owners, the NDP does not specifically state that CJNG members pursue individuals that have failed to pay extortion fees throughout Mexico, only that a criminal organization may be motivated to track someone in Mexico if they owe a large debt, are the object of a vendetta, or refused to work for the gang. The NDP does not specify the amount of unpaid debt that would motivate an organization like CJNG to pursue an individual throughout Mexico. The RPD found that based on this evidence, the Applicants do not have the profile of people whom the CJNG would pursue across Mexico.[object Object][21] The RPD accepted the objective evidence stating that the CJNG have various means to locate their targets and that they have sophisticated methods of communicating with one another. However, the RPD found limited evidence to demonstrate that the CJNG would be motivated to pursue the Applicants in Merida, and that the NDP does not mention CJNG using any of its sophisticated methods of communication to track those who refuse to pay extortion fees. For these reasons, the RPD found that on the basis of the available evidence, the Applicants do not face a risk of harm or danger of torture at the hands of the CJNG in Merida.[object Object][22] At the second prong of the test for an IFA, the RPD noted the high threshold that must be met for the Applicants to demonstrate that relocation to the proposed IFA is unreasonable, requiring proof of adverse conditions that would jeopardize their lives and safety, such that relocation would be unduly harsh (Ranganathan at para 15; Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 at 598 (CA)).[object Object][23] The RPD acknowledged the Applicants’ contention that relocating their business in Merida, once again making them vulnerable to extortion. The RPD found that this is a generalized risk faced by all business in Mexico and does not preclude relocation. The RPD further found insufficient evidence to show that the Applicants could not find other employment opportunities, given their individual employment experience. The RPD noted that the Applicants are all educated and although they may encounter difficulties in finding employment and housing in Merida, their past experiences would help them to find work and accommodation. The RPD further noted that women face gender-based discrimination in Yucatan, but found that relocation is not unreasonable for both the Associate Applicants Azucena and Eusebia, considering their individual circumstances and their history of gainful employment.[object Object][24] The RPD ultimately found that the Applicants failed to discharge their burden under the second prong of the IFA test and, in turn, relocation to Merida is reasonable in light of the evidence and circumstances.[object Object]C. Decision under Review [25] In a decision dated April 26, 2022, the RAD dismissed the Applicants’ appeal and confirmed the RPD’s finding that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Merida.[object Object](1) Nexus with a Convention Ground [26] On appeal, the Applicants submitted that the RPD erred in finding that their claims failed to establish a nexus between their fear of persecution and an enumerated Convention ground, specifically in ignoring the ground of political opinion or membership in a particular social group, that group being successful business owners.[object Object][27] The RAD found that the Applicants’ particular circumstances do not meet the definitions for either of these enumerated grounds. The RAD noted that the relevant question is whether the agent of persecution considers the Applicants’ conduct to be political or attributes political activities to them (Inzunza v Canada (Employment and Immigration), 1979 CanLII 2530 (FCA)). The RAD found that there is no evidence that the CJNG cartel has viewed the Applicants’ actions as being political in nature and persecuted them on this basis, or that the cartel kidnapped people for political reasons rather than criminal activity for the purpose of obtaining ransom money. The RAD further found that being a business owner does not qualify within the three broad categories of a “particularly social group” outlined in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689.[object Object](2) IFA [28] The RAD found that the RPD erred in its finding with respect to the cartel’s means to locate the Applicants, but that it did not err in finding that the CJNG lacks the motivation to pursue the Applicants in the IFA or that the Applicants failed to demonstrate that relocation to the IFA is unreasonable.[object Object][29] In assessing the cartel’s means to locate the Applicants, the RAD found that, contrary to the RPD’s finding, the NDP evidence demonstrates that the cartel is present in any proposed IFA location and that it would consequently have the means to locate the Applicants throughout Mexico, including in the state of Yucatan. That being said, the RAD agreed with the RPD’s finding that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the CJNG was motivated to pursue the Applicants throughout Mexico. The RAD acknowledged the Applicants’ submission that the CJNG remains motivated to locate them for making only a partial payment of the ransom demanded for the release of Ulises, but ultimately found that their belief in the cartel’s motivation is unsubstantiated by evidence on the record. The RAD cited this Court’s decision in Olusola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 799 (“Olusola”) for the proposition that while a claimant’s sworn testimony creates the presumption of truthfulness, this is “not a presumption that everything the witness believes to be true, but has no direct knowledge of, is actually true” (Olusola at para 25).[object Object][30] The RAD further noted that the CJNG’s threatening demands and kidnapping of Ulises were actions associated with the Applicants’ successful business, rather than borne out of a personal vendetta. Therefore, the current operation of the butchery business by Neftali would result in Neftali becoming the target of the cartel’s demands. However, the Applicants testified that they are unaware of any attempts by the cartel to contact their family members in Mexico. The RAD found that the lack of evidence demonstrating the cartel’s efforts to pursue the Applicants for their continuing business, specifically those family members who have relocated to other parts of Mexico, is indicative of a lack of motivation to pursue the Applicants in the proposed IFA.[object Object][31] On appeal, the Applicants submitted that the RPD erred in its assessment of the second prong of the IFA test, concerning whether the Applicants’ relocation to the proposed IFA is reasonable. In support of this submission, the Applicants cited this Court’s decisions in Zaytoun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 939 (“Zaytoun”) and Cruz Martinez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 399 (“Cruz Martinez”).[object Object][32] The RAD found that the Applicants’ circumstances can be differentiated from those in Zaytoun because unlike the applicant in that case, the Applicants are undistinguishable from a majority of the population by religion or by surname. The RAD acknowledged the Applicants’ reliance on Cruz Martinez for the proposition that the decision-maker must demonstrate that an IFA is qualitatively different from parts of the country where there is a reasonable chance of persecution. However, the RAD found that Cruz Martinez does not displace the burden on an applicant to establish that relocation to the proposed IFA is unreasonable. The RAD found that the RPD reasonably assessed the issue of the cartel’s motivation and was not required to demonstrate that the proposed IFA is qualitatively different than other regions of Mexico because the burden of proof remains with the Applicants.[object Object][33] Noting that the Applicants made no further submissions on appeal concerning the second prong of the IFA test, the RAD agreed with the RPD’s finding that the Applicants’ failed to discharge their burden to establish that relocation to Merida would be unreasonable in their circumstances. For these reasons, the RAD dismissed the appeal and upheld the RPD’s decision.[object Object]III. Issue and Standard of Review[object Object][34] The sole issue is whether the RAD’s decision is reasonable.[object Object][35] The standard of review is not disputed. The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 16–17, 23–25) (“Vavilov”). I agree.[object Object][36] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review (Vavilov at paras 12-13). The reviewing court must determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified (Vavilov at para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision-maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences (Vavilov at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135).[object Object][37] For a decision to be unreasonable, the applicant must establish the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision-maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep” (Vavilov at para 100; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Mason, 2021 FCA 156 at para 36).[object Object]IV. Analysis[object Object][38] The Applicants submit that the RAD erroneously found that their claims do not establish a nexus with a Convention ground and that they have a viable IFA in Merida, rendering the decision unreasonable.[object Object][39] In my view, the RAD did not err in either of these aspects. It reasonably found that the Applicants’ claims do not establish a nexus with a Convention ground and conducted a reasonable analysis of the IFA.[object Object]A. Nexus with a Convention Ground [40] The Applicants submit that the RAD erred in finding insufficient evidence to establish that the cartel’s actions were motivated by an enumerated Convention ground, particularly the ground of membership in a social group. Specifically, the Applicants contend that the RAD mischaracterized the relevant social group in the Applicants’ case as being business owners, when it should have considered the Applicants’ membership in the social group of people who have failed to pay ransom to a criminal organization.[object Object][41] The Applicants rely on Loyo de Xicara v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 593 (“Loyo de Xicara”), where this Court found that the RPD unreasonably determined that “a personalized risk or threat loses this characteristic based on the mere fact that the criminal conduct in question is common in a given country” (at para 24). The Applicants also rely on Benegas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 45 (“Benegas”), where this Court found that the RPD unreasonably concluded that the attacks against the applicant were not motivated by his political opinion, without regard to the fact that the applicant can be easily identified as a resistor to recruitment by his visible scars from previous attacks (at para 34).[object Object][42] The Respondent submits that the Applicants’ submissions on this issue lack merit because the Applicants testified that although they paid less than the amount that was demanded as ransom for the release of Ulises, it nonetheless secured his release. The Respondent submits that given these facts, the Applicants fail to show that they should have been assessed as part of the social group of people who failed to pay ransom to the CJNG.[object Object][43] I first note that the Applicants’ submissions do not expand on how the factual scenarios or legal findings in either Loyo de Xicara or Benegas is applicable to their circumstances. The RAD’s reasons do not state that there is no nexus between the cartel’s actions and the Convention grounds of political opinion or membership in a social group because the cartel’s actions are common and therefore constitute a generalized risk.[object Object][44] I do not find that the RAD erred by failing to consider the nexus between the Applicants’ claims and their membership in the social group of people who have not paid the full amount of ransom demanded by criminal organizations. The Applicants’ evidence reveals that although they did not pay the full amount, the payment ultimately secured the release of Ulises. It is reasonable for the RAD not to consider the potential nexus between the Applicants’ claims and their membership in the social group of those who do not pay ransom amounts as demanded. This is also reasonable in light of the minimal evidence proffered by the Applicants to demonstrate that they, or other members of their family in Mexico, have been pursued on the basis of their failure to pay the full ransom amount.[object Object][45] For these reasons, I do not find that the RAD erred in assessing in whether the cartel’s actions were motivated by the Applicants’ membership in the social group of business owners and, in turn, finding that their claims do not establish a nexus with a Convention ground.[object Object]B. IFA [46] The Applicants submit that the RAD’s assessment of the IFA is unreasonable on two grounds: 1) in its finding that the CJNG cartel lacks the motivation to pursue the Applicants in the proposed IFA and 2) in its finding that their relocation to the proposed IFA is reasonable in the Applicants’ circumstances.[object Object][47] The Applicants submit that the RAD erred in finding that there is no evidence to support the cartel’s ongoing interest in and pursuit of the Applicants throughout Mexico. The Applicants note that the Associate Applicant Abad testified that members of the family have received phone calls from unknown numbers. They submit that the mere fact that Ulises was released following the ransom payment does not reasonably lead to the finding that the cartel is unmotivated to pursue the Applicants or that relocation is reasonable in the Applicants’ circumstances.[object Object][48] The Respondent submits that the Applicants’ submissions on the IFA issue amount to a request that this Court reweigh the evidence. The Respondent submits that the RAD reasonably found that the Applicants proffered insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the CJNG had a continued interest in them or were still motivated to pursue them throughout Mexico. The Respondent contends that the RAD based this finding on a reasonable assessment of the evidence, which shows that the family business remains operational, that the Applicants are unaware of attempts by the cartel to contact any family members associated with the business, and that their family members have relocated within Mexico without being pursued. The Respondent submits that the RAD reasonably found that the Applicants failed to meet their onus to establish that they would face a risk in the IFA or that relocation would be unreasonable.[object Object][49] I agree. I note that the Applicants’ submissions on these alleged errors are largely vague and unclear. What remains of their submissions appears to request that this Court reassess the evidence, which is not this Court’s role on review (Vavilov at para 125). Their allegation that the RAD unreasonably assessed the cartel’s motivation to pursue them and the reasonableness of their relocation to Merida is unsupported by references to the decision or clear evidence of a reviewable error. A review of the RAD’s reasons reveals a thorough and reasonable assessment of the facts that is responsive to the evidentiary record. The Applicants are unable to demonstrate that the CJNG attempted to contact or pursue them since they paid a portion of the ransom and Ulises was released. There is no evidence that their family members in Mexico, who are associated with the continuing business and relocated within Mexico, were pursued.[object Object][50] In the absence of this evidence, the RAD’s reasons exhibit a clear line of analysis to arrive at the conclusion that the cartel lacks the motivation to pursue them in the IFA, supported by the factual and legal constrains (Vavilov at paras 99, 102). Given the minimal evidence provided, the RAD reasonably found that the Applicants failed to establish that relocation to Merida would be unreasonable, and provides clear and cogent reasons for this finding. For these reasons, I find that the RAD reasonably assessed the IFA issue in relation to the Applicants’ circumstances and its decision is therefore reasonable.[object Object]V. Conclusion[object Object][51] This application for judicial review is dismissed. The RAD’s decision is reasonable in light of the Applicants’ circumstances and evidence. No questions for certification were raised, and I agree that none arise.[object Object]JUDGMENT in IMM-4441-22[object Object]THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:[object Object]This application for judicial review is dismissed.[object Object]There is no question to certify.[object Object]“Shirzad A.”[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]IMM-4441-22[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]JOEL MARTINEZ ALTAMIRANO, EUSEBIA ROSALIA REYES LUNA, ABAD GILBERTO MORA REYES, AZUCENA MORA REYES AND GAEL MARTINEZ MORA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]Toronto, Ontario[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]March 29, 2023[object Object]JUDGMENT and reasons:[object Object]AHMED J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]July 19, 2023[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]Khatidja Moloo-Alam[object Object]For The Applicants[object Object]Asha Gafar[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]Green and Spiegel LLP Barristers and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario[object Object]For The Applicants[object Object]Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]	cluster: CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the RAD's decision is reasonable in light of the Applicants' circumstances and evidence. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.	cluster: SUMMARY: [object Object][object Object][object Object]The Applicants, Joel Martinez Altamirano, his wife Azucena Mora Reyes, and their child Gael Martinez Mora, along with Azucena's mother Eusebia Rosalia Reyes Luna and brother Abad Gilberto Mora Reyes, are Mexican citizens who made claims for refugee protection in Canada. The Applicants claimed to be victims of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) in Mexico, alleging that they were extorted and threatened after failing to pay a ransom for the release of Eusebia's son Ulises, who was kidnapped by the cartel in 2019. The Applicants claimed that they feared persecution or harm in Mexico at the hands of the CJNG cartel if they returned.[object Object][object Object]The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Applicants were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The RPD determined that the Applicants had a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Merida, Mexico, and that relocation to Merida was reasonable in their circumstances.[object Object][object Object]The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) upheld the RPD's decision, finding that the Applicants' claims did not establish a nexus with a Convention ground and that they had a viable IFA in Merida. The RAD found that the Applicants had failed to demonstrate that the CJNG had a continued interest in pursuing them or that relocation to Merida would be unreasonable.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The issue before the court is whether the RAD's decision is reasonable. The Applicants submit that the RAD erred in finding that their claims do not establish a nexus with a Convention ground and that they have a viable IFA in Merida.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court applied the standard of review of reasonableness, as established in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. The court found that the RAD's decision was reasonable in light of the Applicants' circumstances and evidence.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court analyzed the Applicants' submissions on the nexus with a Convention ground and the IFA issue. The Applicants argued that the RAD erred in finding insufficient evidence to establish that the cartel's actions were motivated by an enumerated Convention ground, particularly the ground of membership in a social group. However, the court found that the RAD's reasons were reasonable and that the Applicants' evidence did not establish a nexus between their claims and the Convention grounds.[object Object][object Object]The Applicants also argued that the RAD erred in finding that the CJNG cartel lacks the motivation to pursue them in the proposed IFA and that their relocation to the proposed IFA is reasonable in their circumstances. However, the court found that the RAD's reasons were reasonable and that the Applicants failed to establish that the CJNG had a continued interest in pursuing them or that relocation to Merida would be unreasonable.[object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object][object Object]The court concluded that the RAD's decision is reasonable in light of the Applicants' circumstances and evidence. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
  cluster: CONCLUSION: Osipova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)[object Object]Court (s) Database[object Object]Federal Court Decisions[object Object]Date[object Object]2024-07-05[object Object]Neutral citation[object Object]2024 FC 1055[object Object]File numbers[object Object]IMM-9267-23[object Object]Decision Content[object Object]Date: 20240705[object Object]Docket: IMM-9267-23[object Object]Citation: 2024 FC 1055[object Object]Ottawa, Ontario, July 5, 2024[object Object]PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Aylen[object Object]BETWEEN:[object Object]LIUDMILA OSIPOVA[object Object]Applicant[object Object]and[object Object]THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]Respondent[object Object]JUDGMENT AND REASONS[object Object][1] The Applicant, a 73-year old mother and grandmother of Russian citizenship, seeks judicial review of a reconsideration decision dated May 26, 2023, made by a Senior Immigration Officer [Officer] at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, refusing the Applicant’s application for permanent residence from within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].[object Object][2] The Applicant asserts that the Officer’s decision was unreasonable on the basis that the Officer: (a) failed to conduct a proper assessment of hardship relating to a potential return to Russia based on the Applicant’s personal characteristics and her establishment in Canada; (b) erred in their assessment of the best interests of the child [BIOC] as they failed to be alert, alive and sensitive to the best interests of the Applicant’s grandchild; and (c) failed to give proper consideration to the evidence provided by the Applicant with respect to adverse country conditions in Russia and the hardship she would face in her home country.[object Object][3] The sole issue for determination by this Court is whether the Officer’s decision was reasonable.[object Object][4] The parties agree and I concur that the applicable standard of review of an H&C decision is reasonableness [see Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 at para 44 [Kanthasamy]]. When reviewing for reasonableness, the Court must take a “reasons first” approach and determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified [see Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at paras 8, 59]. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker [see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 15, 85]. The Court will intervene only if it is satisfied there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency [see Adeniji-Adele v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 418 at para 11].[object Object][5] Subsection 25(1) of the IRPA gives the Minister discretion to exempt foreign nationals from the ordinary requirements of that statute and grant permanent resident status in Canada if the Minister is of the opinion that such relief is justified by H&C considerations. An H&C determination under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA is a global one, where all the relevant considerations are to be weighed cumulatively in order to determine if relief is justified in the circumstances. Relief is considered justified if the circumstances would excite in a reasonable person in a civilized community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of another [see Kanthasamy, supra at paras 13, 28; Caleb v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1018 at para 10].[object Object][6] While the Applicant has asserted a number of grounds of review, I am satisfied that the Officer’s BIOC analysis was sufficiently flawed so as to render their decision unreasonable.[object Object][7] Subsection 25(1) of the IRPA mandates that officers consider the BIOC. In Kanthasamy, the Supreme Court of Canada states the following with respect to the BIOC:[object Object][35] The “best interests” principle is “highly contextual” because of the “multitude of factors that may impinge on the child’s best interest”: Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4 (CanLII), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 11; Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at para. 20. It must therefore be applied in a manner responsive to each child’s particular age, capacity, needs and maturity: see A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30 (CanLII), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, at para. 89. The child’s level of development will guide its precise application in the context of a particular case.[object Object][…][object Object][39] A decision under s. 25(1) will therefore be found to be unreasonable if the interests of children affected by the decision are not sufficiently considered: Baker, at para. 75. This means that decision-makers must do more than simply state that the interests of a child have been taken into account: Hawthorne, at para. 32. Those interests must be “well identified and defined” and examined “with a great deal of attention” in light of all the evidence: Legault v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125 (CanLII), [2002] 4 F.C. 358 (C.A.), at paras. 12 and 31; Kolosovs v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 165 (CanLII), 323 F.T.R. 181, at paras. 9-12.[object Object][40] Where, as here, the legislation specifically directs that the best interests of a child who is “directly affected” be considered, those interests are a singularly significant focus and perspective: A.C., at paras. 80-81. […][object Object][8] The BIOC includes “such matters as children’s rights, needs, and best interests; maintaining connections between family members,” among other factors [see Kanthasamy, supra at para 34 citing Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 559 at para 41]. Although there is no “specific formula” for assessing the BIOC factor, the test above, as articulated in Kanthasamy, must be met [see Motrichko v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 516 at para 22 [Motrichko]].[object Object][9] The issue, therefore, is whether the interests of the Applicant’s granddaughter were “well identified and defined” by the Officer and examined “with a great deal of attention,” in light of all the evidence. If not, then the Officer’s decision is unreasonable.[object Object][10] The evidence before the Officer was that the Applicant had been residing with her daughter and her son-in-law in Canada as a visitor since 2017. When the Applicant submitted her H&C application, her daughter was pregnant. The Applicant updated her application following the birth of her granddaughter in February of 2022; evidence was provided that the Applicant is involved in the upbringing of her infant granddaughter and will take on an increasingly important role in caring for her when her daughter’s maternity leave ends and both parents are working on a full-time basis.[object Object][11] The Officer’s reasons for decision related to the best interests of the Applicant’s granddaughter provide, in their entirety, as follows:[object Object]A factor to be considered in assessing a child’s welfare is the level of dependency between the child and the applicant. With regard to this factor, the applicant submits that during the time she has been present in Canada, she has assisted in the care and upbringing of Sophie. Undoubtedly, the applicant has forged an emotional attachment to her.[object Object]Notwithstanding, Sophie does not appear to be wholly dependent on the applicant. It would be reasonable to expect that Sophie will continue to live in Canada with her parents as her primary caregivers. While I do not doubt that the interaction and support the applicant has provided to Sophie is of value, there is insufficient objective evidence to establish that the applicant’s return to Russia would compromise Sophie’s best interests.[object Object][Emphasis added.][object Object][12] I find that the Officer’s highly generalized BIOC assessment renders the Officer’s decision unreasonable [see Motrichko, supra at para 26]. It was incumbent on the Officer to properly identify and define the granddaughter’s needs and to examine them “with a great deal of attention,” as Kanthasamy requires. The Officer’s BIOC analysis falls short of this standard. As in Chamas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1352 [Chamas], the Officer never identified what was in the child’s best interest, or how the granddaughter would be affected by the Applicant’s departure. The Officer merely acknowledged that the Applicant has been involved in her granddaughter’s care and upbringing, and that “the [A]pplicant has forged an emotional attachment to her,” without addressing the granddaughter’s attachment to the Applicant. The Officer fails to consider what needs the granddaughter might have, or how the Applicant’s return to Russia might impact the granddaughter. In particular, the emotional and practical hardships the Applicant’s granddaughter would face if the Applicant is forced to leave the country are not addressed in detail, despite there being evidence of hardship on the record [see Motrichko, supra at para 27]. For example, the Applicant’s daughter provided a letter stating that she would be returning to work after her maternity leave and that she needed the Applicant’s help to raise and care for the child. This is a very practical form of support that the Applicant cannot provide from Russia, yet the Officer fails to grapple with this evidence and address whether it is in the best interests of the granddaughter for the Applicant to provide this care.[object Object][13] Further, the Officer failed to properly apply the test set out in Kanthasamy by placing undue emphasis on the degree to which the granddaughter depends on the Applicant. The Officer concluded that the granddaughter “does not appear to be wholly dependent on the [A]pplicant,” and that she would “continue to live in Canada with her parents as her primary caregivers.” As Chamas and Motrichko make clear, the fact that an applicant is not a primary caregiver is not determinative. In Motrichko, this Court noted that “the analysis the Officer was called upon to undertake was not whether the grandchildren would manage or survive in the absence of their grandmother but how they would be impacted, both practically and emotionally, by the departure of the [a]pplicant in the particular circumstances of the case” [see Motrichko, supra at para 27]. The same is true here. However, much like in Chamas, the Officer stopped asking what, if any, impact the Applicant’s departure would have on her granddaughter after determining that the Applicant was not her primary caregiver [see Chamas, supra at para 42].[object Object][14] The Respondent asserts that while the Applicant and her daughter provided letters stating that the daughter will be returning to work upon completion of her maternity leave, the Applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her removal would undermine the granddaughter’s best interests, such as the inability to seek alternative childcare arrangements or the degree of the Applicant’s involvement in her granddaughter’s day-to-day needs. The Respondent asserts that absent this evidence, it was open to the Officer to find that separation between the Applicant and her grandchild alone is insufficient to warrant H&C relief. However, the Respondent’s explanation constitutes an impermissible attempt to supplement the reasons of the Officer [see Ehigiator v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 308 at para 53]. Although it was open to the Officer to conclude that the Applicant’s evidence was insufficient because she failed to demonstrate an inability to seek alternative childcare arrangements or the degree of involvement she has in her granddaughter’s day-to-day needs, the Officer did not provide any such justification for their decision.[object Object][15] Accordingly, I find that the Officer’s BIOC analysis was unreasonable, which rendered the decision as a whole unreasonable. As such, I need not go on to consider the other grounds of review raised by the Applicant.[object Object][16] The application for judicial review is allowed, the decision is set aside and the matter is remitted to a different officer for redetermination. Prior to the redetermination, the Applicant shall be given an opportunity to provide updated submissions and documentation in support of her application.[object Object][17] Neither party proposed a question for certification and I agree that none arises.[object Object]JUDGMENT in IMM-9267-23[object Object]THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:[object Object]The application for judicial review is allowed.[object Object]The decision of the Senior Immigration Officer dated May 26, 2023, refusing the Applicant’s application for permanent residence based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is set aside and the matter is remitted back to a different officer for redetermination. Prior to the redetermination, the Applicant shall be given an opportunity to provide updated submissions and documentation in support of her application.[object Object]The parties proposed no question for certification and none arises.[object Object]“Mandy Aylen”[object Object]Judge[object Object]FEDERAL COURT[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD[object Object]DOCKET:[object Object]IMM-9267-23[object Object]STYLE OF CAUSE:[object Object]LIUDMILA OSIPOVA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION[object Object]PLACE OF HEARING:[object Object]TORONTO, ONTARIO[object Object]DATE OF HEARING:[object Object]JULY 4, 2024[object Object]JUDGMENT and reasons:[object Object]AyLEN J.[object Object]DATED:[object Object]JULY 5, 2024[object Object]APPEARANCES:[object Object]John Yoon[object Object]For The Applicant[object Object]Eli Lo Re[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]SOLICITORS OF RECORD:[object Object]Dov Maierovitz Barrister and Solicitor Toronto, Ontario[object Object]For The Applicant[object Object]Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario[object Object]For The Respondent[object Object]	cluster: CONCLUSION: The court allowed the application for judicial review, set aside the decision, and remitted the matter back to a different officer for redetermination. Prior to the redetermination, the person concerned would be given an opportunity to provide updated submissions and documentation in support of her application. The court found that the Officer's BIOC analysis was unreasonable, which rendered the decision as a whole unreasonable, and that the person concerned had raised sufficient grounds for judicial review.	cluster: ISSUES: The sole issue before the court was whether the Officer's decision was reasonable. The person concerned argued that the Officer's decision was unreasonable due to several factors, including a failure to conduct a proper assessment of hardship, an error in assessing the best interests of the child, and a failure to give proper consideration to adverse country conditions in Russia.

• Loss: MultipleNegativesRankingLoss with these parameters:
  json

  1{ 2 "scale": 20.0, 3 "similarity_fct": "cos_sim" 4}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

• eval_strategy: steps
• per_device_train_batch_size: 4
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
• learning_rate: 2e-05
• num_train_epochs: 1
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• fp16: True
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Training Logs

Framework Versions

• Python: 3.11.9
• Sentence Transformers: 3.1.1
• Transformers: 4.45.2
• PyTorch: 2.4.1+cu121
• Accelerate: 1.0.1
• Datasets: 3.0.2
• Tokenizers: 0.20.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

MultipleNegativesRankingLoss