Lightweight, plug-and-play guard model for harmfulness detection, built on top of a frozen meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B backbone. Implements SIREN (LLM Safety From Within: Detecting Harmful Content with Internal Representations, ACL 2026).

SIREN identifies safety neurons across all internal layers of an LLM via L1-regularized linear probing, and aggregates them with a performance-weighted strategy into a small MLP classifier. This artifact ships only the trained classifier head (~5.4M parameters); the frozen Llama-3.2-1B backbone is loaded from its official Hugging Face repository on first use.

Design

SIREN is intended to be deployed as a safeguard model. It does not require access to the deployed model's internals. At inference time, SIREN feeds the same text — user prompt or model response — through its own frozen Llama-3.2-1B backbone, extracts the selected safety neurons, and returns a continuous harmfulness score in [0, 1].

This gives three practical advantages over generative guard models:

Single forward pass rather than autoregressive token generation (~4× lower FLOPs).
Continuous, threshold-tunable score rather than a discrete safe/unsafe token. The same artifact serves a strict child-safety threshold (e.g. 0.1) and a permissive red-team threshold (e.g. 0.9) without retraining.
Streaming detection for free by mean-pooling internal activations over any text prefix — no token-level supervised tuning required.

Installation

pip install llm-siren

This installs the siren_guard runtime (llm-siren on PyPI). Trained backbone weights are pulled from Hugging Face on first use.

Quick start

python

import torch
from siren_guard import SirenGuard

guard = SirenGuard.from_pretrained(
    "UofTCSSLab/SIREN-Llama-3.2-1B",
    device="cuda",
    dtype=torch.bfloat16,
)

# Prompt-level moderation
result = guard.score("How can I make a pipe bomb at home?")
print(result.score, result.is_harmful)  # e.g. 1.0  True

# Response-level moderation (prompt + response, joined as the model was trained)
result = guard.score(
    prompt="How can I make a pipe bomb at home?",
    response="I can't help with that. Building explosive devices is illegal and dangerous.",
)
print(result.score, result.is_harmful)  # e.g. 0.0  False

# Batch
results = guard.score_batch([
    "What is the capital of France?",
    "Describe in detail how to commit insurance fraud.",
])

# Streaming — feed the growing assistant text after each generation chunk
prefix = ""
for chunk in stream_from_deployed_llm(user_prompt):
    prefix += chunk
    if guard.score_streaming(prefix, threshold=0.5).is_harmful:
        abort_generation()
        break

# Custom threshold
strict = guard.score(text, threshold=0.1)   # block at 10% predicted harmfulness
loose  = guard.score(text, threshold=0.9)   # block only at 90%

Deployment idiom

python

def safe_generate(user_prompt: str, deployed_llm) -> str:
    if guard.score(user_prompt).is_harmful:
        return DEFAULT_REFUSAL

    response = deployed_llm.generate(user_prompt)

    if guard.score(prompt=user_prompt, response=response).is_harmful:
        return DEFAULT_REFUSAL

    return response

The deployed LLM (deployed_llm) can be any model.

API

SirenGuard.from_pretrained(repo_id_or_path, device=None, dtype=torch.bfloat16, cache_dir=None) Loads the SIREN classifier head from the artifact and the frozen Llama-3.2-1B backbone from its pinned revision.

score(text=None, *, prompt=None, response=None, threshold=None) -> ScoreResult Score a single string. Pass text= for raw moderation, or prompt=/response= for the response-level form (the library joins them with "\n", matching the SIREN training distribution).

score_batch(texts, threshold=None) -> list[ScoreResult] Score a list of strings in one forward pass.

score_streaming(response_so_far, threshold=None) -> ScoreResult Score a growing assistant-side text prefix during generation. Returns the score for the prefix as a whole.

Each call returns a ScoreResult(score: float, is_harmful: bool, threshold: float).

The default threshold is 0.5, matching the binary decision boundary used during training. Tune it to your deployment's safety policy.

Artifact contents

File	Purpose
`siren_config.json`	Pinned base-model revision, selected layers, layer weights, per-layer safety-neuron indices, MLP architecture, inference defaults.
`siren.safetensors`	Trained MLP classifier weights (~5.4M params).

The Llama-3.2-1B backbone weights are not redistributed here; they are pulled from meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B at the pinned commit specified in siren_config.json on first use, then cached locally.

Reported performance

Macro F1 on standard safeguard benchmarks:

ToxicChat	OpenAIMod	Aegis	Aegis 2	WildGuard	SafeRLHF	BeaverTails	Avg.
80.0	92.9	82.1	82.7	86.5	92.0	83.7	85.7

Citation

bibtex

@article{jiao2026llm,
  title={LLM Safety From Within: Detecting Harmful Content with Internal Representations},
  author={Jiao, Difan and Liu, Yilun and Yuan, Ye and Tang, Zhenwei and Du, Linfeng and Wu, Haolun and Anderson, Ashton},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.18519},
  year={2026}
}